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MARBURYAND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE:
THE SHADOW OF WHI7TNGTON V POLKAND THE
MARYLAND JUDICIARY BATTLE
Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Legal historians have searched for state law antecedents to Mar-
bury v. Madison,' and have pinpointed the Maryland decision Whitting-
ton v. Polk2 for its bold dicta about judicial supremacy. The facts of
Whittington are strikingly similar to those of Marbury: when the Repub-
licans seized the Maryland legislature in 1801, they stripped Federal-
istjudges of their offices, and an aggrieved Federalist judge, William
Whittington, sued to reclaim his position. Only a few months before
Marbuy, the Maryland General Court proclaimed in Whittington:
It is the office and province of the court.., to determine whether an act
of the legislature, which assumes the appearance of a law, and is clothed
with the garb of authority, is made pursuant to the power vested by the
constitution in the legislature; for if it is not the result or emanation of
authority derived from the constitution, it is not law, and cannot influ-
ence the judgment of the court in the decision of the question before
them.4
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1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 1 H. &J. 236 (Md. 1802).
3 PAUL S. CIARKSON & R. SAMUELJETr, LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 200 (1970); ROBERT
LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISONANDJUDICIAL REVIEW 76-77 & 76 n.95 (1989); CHARLES G.
HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OFJ UDICIAL SUPREMACY 106-08 (1914); William M. Meigs, The
Relation of the Judiciary to the Constitution, 19 AM. L. REV. 175, 185 (1885); James B. Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140 (1893).
For court decisions crediting Whittington as a foundation for the doctrine ofjudicial review, see,
for example, Attorney General of Maryland. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929 (Md. 1981); Perkins v. Esk-
ridge, 366 A.2d 21 (Md. 1976); Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, 848 & n.9 (Md. 1975); Jones v.
Freeman, 146 P.2d 564 (Okla. 1943). But see RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS:
COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 244 (1971) (offering a more balanced view of
Whittington, but very briefly, and without much detail).
4 Whittington, I H. &J. at 244.
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The author was Judge Jeremiah Townley Chase, the cousin and close
friend of Justice Samuel Chase, who joined Chief Justice John Mar-
shall's opinion in Marbury.
Judge Jeremiah Chase's decision laid a foundation for Marbury,
but in a way unrecognized by other historians. Rather than establish-
ing the power of judicial review, Whittington v. Polk more clearly an-
nounced the weakness of the courts and the retreat of the Federalist
judges from confrontation with the Republicans. More important
than its dicta, Whittington rejected the Federalist judge William Whit-
tington's claims, despite the fact that his case was stronger than the
Republicans', and despite the fact that the Maryland General Court
had a partisan Federalist majority that would have sympathized with
the plaintiff.
On the 200th anniversary of Whittington and approaching the
200th anniversary of Marbury, this article revisits these two decisions
and challenges legal scholars' assumptions that they were such strong
precedents for judicial review.5 When one takes into account the
5 This paper questions the premise that Marbury was itself the robust origin of judicial re-
view. Marbusy was certainly a brilliant political maneuver. By striking down the original juris-
diction provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789-the provisions that would have enabled the
Court to return Marbury to his office-Marshall sacrificed one power of the federal judiciary to
battle back against Jefferson, while signaling the future use of an even broader power. Some
scholars also revere Marshall's opinion for establishing the fully-formed power of judicial re-
view. Emblematic of this consensus, Alexander Bickel credited Marshall's opinion with sponta-
neously creating the American judiciary, replete with judicial review:
[T]he institution of the judiciary needed to be summoned up out of the constitutional
vapors, shaped, and maintained; and the Great Chief Justice, John Marshall-not single-
handed, but first and foremost-was there to do it and did. If any social process can be
said to have been "done" at a given time and by a given act, it is Marshall's achievement.
The time was 1803; the act was the decision in the case of Marbury v. Madison.
ALYXANDER M. BICKEI, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1 (1962). Robert McCloskey observed
that Marbury was a "masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall's capacity to side-
step danger while seeming to court it, to advance in one direction while his opponents are look-
ing in another." ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 40 (1960). Indeed,
Marshall sidestepped danger with indirection, but just how far did Marshall advance in that
other direction?
However, the most fundamental question is whether Marbury so carefully dodged direct po-
litical confrontation that it significantly diminished the power of its announcement of judicial
review. After all, if the Court was willing to talk about judicial review mostly in dicta and only
use it for the benefit of the newJeffersonian regime against the Federalists, how potent was this
threat ofjudicial supremacy?
Recently, scholars have begun questioning Marbury's force as the foundation for judicial re-
view by placing the decision in its historical context. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE ROOTS
OF PRESIDENTIALISM (forthcoming 2003); CLINTON, supra note 3; James M. O'Fallon, Marbury,
44 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992). These studies provide several angles on this question. First, Mar-
shall's writings indicate that he personally believed that the Republican Repeal of the Judiciary
Act of 1801 (the MidnightJudge's Act) was unconstitutional. O'Fallon, supra, at 240. However,
when most of the other Justices wanted to capitulate to the Republicans, Marshall acquiesced,
and eventually, the Court ruled that Congress had the power to repeal the Act in Stuart v. Laird
a few weeks before the decision in Marbury was announced. Id. Because control over the life-
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broader contexts, both decisions were in fact judicial capitulations to
aggressive legislatures and executives. The Maryland General Court
asserted its judicial supremacy only in dicta, and the court failed to
enforce judicial supremacy when it was legally justified. This article
picks apart the court's reasoning step by step, using Whittington to il-
luminate Marbury and Marbury to illuminate Whittington. This re-
interpretation offers new historical evidence from contemporaneous
discussions by politicians, judges, and newspaper editorials to demon-
strate that the Maryland court departed from the Federalists', and
some Republicans', understanding of the legal issues.
In addition to revising our understanding of Whittington itself, the
most important point of this historical inquiry is that it questions
Marbury as the basis for activist judicial review. The interpretation of
Whittington offered in this article helps clarify that Marbuy was truly a
survival strategy of deference. The Maryland General Court, similar
to the Marshall Court, essentially used the threat of judicial review as
a fig leaf, while the nakedness of their acquiescence was apparent to
all observers. The judges in both courts opted to live to fight another
day, leaving behind dicta or sidestepping holdings that could be un-
earthed by future judges once the American judiciary solidified its
status. This paper concludes that the development of judicial review
ought to be understood in terms of institutional history, rather than
culled from the language of these decisions. Marshall laid the foun-
dations for judicial power less in Marbury, and more in leading the
Court to its revered "golden age" from 1812 to 1825, which estab-
lished the Court's power on the national stage.6 The Marshall Court
never again struck down an act of Congress after 1803, but this later
period of the Marshall Court garnered enough prestige to be passed
on to future Courts. Then, in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Court directly challenged Congress essentially the first time.
Marshall's strategy in Marbury allowed him to survive to achieve this
stature later, but Marbury did not get the Court to that doctrinal end
itself.
tenured federal courts was far more important than a few minor offices as justice of the peace,
the issue in Stuart v. Laird was of greater political significance than Marbuy, and that decision
established a stronger text and context of judicial weakness. Furthermore, the Court decided
Stuart on the basis of "acquiescence" to established practice, and the privileged role of the First
Congress, as a kind of extended Constitutional Convention, to explain the Constitution's mean-
ing. However, just weeks later, when reliance on the First Congress and its Judiciary Act would
have given the Supreme Court the power over original jurisdiction, they conveniently over-
turned that power to avoid confrontation.
6 1 HAMPTON CARSON, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 242
(1902); R. NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 83-88 (1968). But see
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 191 (1988) (questioning the
value of naming phases of the Court).
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The Rehnquist Court, in an unprecedented wave of judicial activ-
ism, has struck down acts of Congress in thirty-three cases since 1995.'
One sixth of the Supreme Court's decisions invalidating federal stat-
8
utes in the nation's history have come down in the last seven years.
During a time of such unprecedented judicial activism, reflecting
about Marbury and the history of judicial review is all the more impor-
tant. Because Marbury embodies judicial caution as much as judicial
power (if not more so), the current Court should not rely on Marbury
as precedent to support its activism. 9 Judges and scholars ought to be
looking elsewhere (perhaps the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century) for the foundation of judicial review of Congress, and
should adopt a more incrementalist approach to the development of
judicial power."' This article suggests that the story about Marbury
7 See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 80 nn.3-5
(2001). In addition to the twenty-nine cases they list, the Court also struck down federal laws in
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures, 523 U.S. 340 (1998); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389
(2002); Thompson v. Western State Medical Center., 122 S. Ct. 1497 (2002); and Federal Maratine
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).
8 From 1789 to 1986, the Supreme Court struck down federal laws in 120 cases. For a com-
plete list, see THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANAINSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 2001-31 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1996). See alsojed Han-
delsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: A Solution to the Supreme Court's Five-Four Problem, 37 GA. L.
REv. (forthcoming Spring 2003).
9 For an example of the Rehnquist Court's reliance on Marbury for the assertion ofjudic .al
supremacy, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) ("[E]ver since Marbuly this
Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.").
10 After Marbury, the Supreme Court did not strike down another act of Congress until Dred
Scott v.Sanford in 1857, certainly not the most attractive precedent for judicial review. Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). The first series of Court decisions against Congress was during
Reconstruction, when, inter alia, the Court overturned Congress's civil rights acts and other leg-
islation. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (striking down federal law penaliz-
ing private conspiracies to violate equal protection of law); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883) (striking down federal law granting equal access to public accommodations); United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (striking down federal law protecting voting rights). 'The
next wave was during the laissez-faire Lochner era decisions from 1895 to 1937. See, e.g., Schech-
ter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down the National Industrial
Recovery Act); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down minimum wage
law for women); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down federal child labor
legislation); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down federal law protecting
employees from dismissal because of membership in a labor union); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 158 U.S. 429 (1895) (striking down the federal income tax). One might also turn to
the Warren Court and the Burger Court for a more modern phase of judicial review of Con-
gress. Whqile these Courts issued many controversial decisions, their review of federal laws is
relatively less contested. The Warren Court's most controversial decisions were its desegrega-
tion, criminal procedure, and First Amendment decisions invalidating state laws or regulating
police conduct. Its federal desegregation decision, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), was
overshadowed by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and of its decisions striking down
federal laws, only a handful provoked a national reaction. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437 (1965) (declaring unconstitutional § 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act of 1959 which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve on the
executive board of a labor organization); Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (strik-
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that Americans have woven together is, more or less, a founding myth
of judicial review." Of course, Marbury and Whittington were pivotal
cases, but their key contribution was less their doctrine, and more
their success in withstanding the Jeffersonian challenge to judicial
independence. If judges continue to base judicial review upon Mar-
bury, then this examination of Whittington and Marbury together sug-
gests that these judges ought to consider a much more deferential
and cautious approach to overturning legislation. The Rehnquist
Court would also be wise to heed the cautious approach of Whitting-
ton, in which Chief Judge Chase urged courts to intervene only when
the importance of the rights in question outweighs the undemocratic
problem ofjudicial review.
2
This new research also helps to answer some persistent historical
questions about Marbury: Why didn't the media report on Marbury's
declaration of judicial review powers? Why didn't the Federalist
plaintiffs continue their suit in lower courts with original jurisdiction,
which the Court's decision seemed to have encouraged? Did the Jus-
tices pass the buck to the lower courts in Marbury, knowing that those
courts were even less likely to offer a remedy? How did Whittington
affect the subsequent events in the fall of 1802 and in 1803, and if the
Maryland court had ruled in Whittington's favor, how might this his-
tory have changed?
Part I offers the background of the Maryland Republicans' attack
on the state's Federalist judges, when Maryland emerged a battle-
ground state shifting to Republican control. This Part traces the
close parallels of Marbury and Whittington, and demonstrates that the
Maryland repeal of a judiciary act and Whittington v. Polk drew the at-
tention of the nation's newspapers, Congressmen, and most impor-
tantly, the Supreme Court Justices themselves. Part II presents the
Maryland General Court's decision in Whittington, and Part III uses
historical research to challenge the court's reasoning and then offers
ing down portions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which prohibited members
of any communist organization from obtaining passports); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)
(declaring unconstitutional the Nationality Act of 1940, which stripped away citizenship from
those who deserted the military). The Burger Court is similar: even its most controversial in-
validations of federal laws were not as controversial as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 13 (1972), or its Es-
tablishment Clause rulings. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (up-
holding states' rights under Tenth Amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking
down parts of campaign finance laws under First Amendment); Frontiero v. Richardson 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (establishing sex as a suspect classification); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970) (holding that voting age legislation exceeded Congress's power under the Fifteenth
Amendment).
1 Robert Lowry Clinton has also described Marbury as "mythical" in questioning its modern
interpretation asjudicial supremacy. SeeCUNTON, supra note 3, at 139-41.
12 Whittington v. Polk, I H. &J. 236, 243 (Md. 1802).
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three legally more persuasive rulings that would have sided with
Whittington and the Federalists.
Part IV considers the effect of Whittington on the various actors in
the judicial struggle: Thomas Jefferson and Gabriel Duvall, the lone
Republican judge on the Maryland General Court; Judge Jeremiah
Townley Chase of the Maryland General Court and Justice Samuel
Chase, Chief Justice Marshall and the other justices in their turn to-
wards accommodation; and the key midnight appointees, including
Maryland's William Marbury. Whittington helps explain why the Fed-
eralistJustices of the Peace and the Midnight Judges did not press on
with their legal claims in lower federal or in state court after Marbury
gave these litigants an apparent green light to do so. For those who
perceive Marbury as a sign of strength by the Federalist judiciary, this
surrender by the Federalist plaintiffs is a nagging question. The
Maryland General Court's capitulation in Whittington sent a signal
that the lower courts would dodge these challenges, so these Federal-
ist appointees may have abandoned the fight. This signal from the
Maryland General Court helps explain why the media's reaction to
Marbury generally ignored its use of judicial review and focused more
on its rejection of the Federalists' claims. 13 This Part also speculates
about how a different decision by the Maryland Court may have dra-
matically changed the course of events leading to Marbury. In short,
the Maryland court might have escalated the conflict, pushing the
Supreme Court on a more confrontational path with the Jeffersoni-
ans. Instead, Whittington provided a model to the U.S. Supreme
Court of strong dicta cloaking deferential holdings.
I. MARBURYAND WHITTINGTON: PARALLEL CASES
A. Marbury
All first-year law students quickly learn the facts of Marbury. In the
1800 election, the Republicans swept Congress and Jefferson edged
Adams in the electoral college, but due to poor foresight, Jefferson
and his running mate Aaron Burr received an equal number of elec-
tors, and the election was thrown to the outgoing Congress in Febru-
ary 1801.14 In the midst of the Federalist-orchestrated deadlock be-
tween Jefferson and Burr, the lame duck Federalist Congress passed
the Judiciary Act of 1801 on February 13, reorganizing the courts into
13 CLINTON, supra note 3, at 102-03.
14 For a good summary of the events leading to Marbury v. Madison, see CLINTON, supra note
3 and O'Fallon, supra note 5. These works, as well as the Marbuy opinion itself, are the sources
for the information that follows unless otherwise noted.
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six circuits and creating sixteen new life-term judicial appointments.5
After Jefferson prevailed in the Congressional vote, Adams and the
Federalists appointed a series of judges and other officials, including
William Marbury as justice of the peace for Washington, D.C., in the
last moments of their terms, resulting in the moniker "the Midnight
Judges."
Once Jefferson was inaugurated in March, he and Secretary of
State James Madison began carving away these appointments. Wil-
liam Marbury and justices of the peace, confirmed for a five-year term
to be held "in good behavior," never received their commissions from
John Marshall while he was Adams's Secretary of State. Given a
golden opportunity to strike a handful of midnight appointments,
Madison refused to grant Marbury and several other appointees their
commissions, and these appointees sued. In December 1801, the Su-
preme Court required the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to
show cause for the failure to issue their commissions. In the mean-
time, the Republican Congress repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801 in
March 1802, terminating the Midnight Judges' offices and the new
circuit system, and it reinstated the Judiciary Act of 1789, with some
slight revisions, in April.' Fearing that the Supreme Court might in-
tervene as soon as it had a chance, the Republicans rammed through
Congress a bill on April 29, 1802 (the same month in which Whitting-
ton was argued) that suspended the next two sessions of the Supreme
Court, postponing the next session to February 1803.
The repeal went into effect without a chance for the Court to
strike it down, and the Justices were expected to return to riding cir-
cuit in the fall, despite the legal claims to these offices by the Mid-
night Judges. In the spring of 1802, Federalist leaders pressured the
Justices to take a stand, and the Justices considered boycotting the
circuits and going on strike. However, the Justices reluctantly de-
cided to ride their circuits in the fall. The MidnightJudges drafted a
protest memorial to Congress and unsuccessfully challenged the Jus-
tice's jurisdiction in the circuit courts in the fall of 1802. In Virginia,
lawyers in Laird v. Stuart directly challenged Chief Justice Marshall's
jurisdiction as a circuit judge for the Fourth Circuit. Marshall dis-
missed the argument without issuing an opinion. In February 1803,
the Supreme Court rejected Marbury's claim, striking down provi-
sions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as unconstitutional for granting the
15 An Act To Provide for the More Convenient Organization of the Courts of the United
States, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801) [hereinafter the JudiciaryAct of 1801].
6 An Act To Repeal Certain Acts Respecting the Organization of the Courts of the United
States; and for Other Purposes, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (1802) [hereinafter the Repeal Act]; An Act
To Amend thejudicial System of the United States, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156 (1802).
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Court original jurisdiction." A few days later, in Stuart v. Laird,' the
Court rejected the jurisdictional challenge, reasoning that the Jus-
tices had acquiesced to riding circuit in the past, and therefore they
did not require specific commissions to ride circuit again. They
avoided the question about whether the Midnight Judges were enti-
tled to those offices themselves.
B. Whittington
Whittington and Marbury are remarkably intertwined. The battle
over the Maryland judiciary closely paralleled the battle over the fed-
eral judiciary in chronology and in legal issues. The central charac-
ters in Whittington had national political significance or were closely
linked to the main characters in Marbury. Most significantly, Whitting-
ton received national attention in congressional debates, the nation's
newspapers, and in the letters of the Supreme Court Justices, thus
shaping the debate over the federal controversy.
1. The Maryland Judiciary and Reforms of 1796
Maryland's Declaration of Rights, drafted in 1776, declared
"[t]hat the independency and uprightness of Judges are essential to
the impartial administration of Justice, and a great security to the
rights and liberties of the people ... ."" To this end, both the Mary-
land Constitution and the Declaration of Rights guaranteed that "the
Chancellor [and] all Judges shall hold their commissions during
good behavior . ,,0 The Maryland Constitution elaborated on the
meaning of "good behavior" by specifying that the judges could be
"removable only for misbehaviour, or conviction in a Court of Law.",2'
The Declaration of Rights required that the Governor and two thirds
of each House must concur in order to remove the offending or con-
victed judge. 22 For other offices, the governor and the council could
"suspend or remove any civil officer who has not a commission, dur-
ing good behaviour," (i.e., offices guaranteed to the holder "during
good behaviour") .23 This key distinction of "during good behaviour"
17 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
19 MD. CONST. OF 1776, The Constitution orForm of Government, art. XXX.
2 Id. art. XL.
21 Id. (emphasis added).
22 Id. art. XXX. Joseph H. Smith mentions that this removal process was additional to the
process of conviction for misbehavior, but that interpretation is inconsistent with Article XL's
use of the word "only." SeeJoseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104,
1154 (1976). Article XXX therefore is more intelligible as describing two stages of one process:
first conviction, then removal by the governor and two thirds of each House.
2.5 MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XLVIII.
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evolved over centuries ofjudicial struggles in England, and the words
"during good behaviour," rather than "during pleasure," signified ju-
dicial independence. 4 Most of the new states created judicial com-
missions that were guaranteed to the judges "during good behav-
iour,"" and that practice was adopted in the U.S. Constitution."'
In the 1790s and the first few years of the 1800s, Maryland's politi-
cal shifts closely followed the nation's. As the party divisions emerged
in 1792, the Federalists solidly controlled Maryland, and retained
power until 1800.27 In 1796, the Federalists revised the state's out-
dated judicial system. Maryland's court structure had been a con-
tinuation of the colonial courts, with county courts that were too dis-
persed, and a remote General Court sitting only in the eastern part of
the state, in Annapolis and Easton. This arrangement was inefficient
and quite inconvenient for the commerce interests in Baltimore.
Furthermore, the county justices had to be reappointed on an annual
basis, which provided too little job security to attract qualified candi-
dates. The Federalist legislature supplemented the General Court
with a local court system of five districts, with a chief justice for each
district and two associate justices for each county. Each chief justice
rode circuit and met with each county's associate justices several
times a year to hear appeals from the county courts.
2
8
The Act of 1796 designated that each justice "shall hold their
commission during good behaviour, and may be removed for misbe-
haviour in the same manner as the chancellor and the judges may be
removed agreeably to the constitution of this state, and not other-
wise. '' Whereas the previous system offered no job security, the new
24 See Smith, supra note 22. See also infra Section ll.B.
See Smith, supra note 22, at 1153-56.
26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
The Federalists held a two-to-one majority of the state House from the mid-1790s to 1800,
and they also dominated the Maryland Senate. See L. MARX RENZULu, JR., MARYLAND: THE
FEDERALIST YEARS 187 (1972); NORMAN K. RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS, 1781-1800, at 517-19
(1978). In 1796, Federalists won six of Maryland's eight congressional districts. Despite some
gains by the Republicans in the U.S. Congressional elections in 1798, the Federalists still re-
tained their two-to-one majority in the House of Delegates. RISJORD, supra, at 544-45 (noting
that the Federalists held a majority of 49 to 24 in 1798, a margin consistent with previous years).
ELLIS, supra note 3, at 243-44; An Act for the Better Administration of Justice in the Sev-
eral Counties of the State, §§ 1I, V (1796), in 2 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND (William Kilty ed., Fre-
derick Green 1800).
2 Id. § IV, ch. XLIII. Section XVIII limits the wayjustices may be replaced:
That the chief justice of any court, appointed and commissioned in virtue of this act,
shall refuse to act, or after acceptance shall resign, die, remove out of his district, or be
rendered incapable to act, or if any associate justice, appointed and commissioned in vir-
tue of this act, shall refuse to act, or after acceptance shall resign, die, be rendered inca-
pable to act, or remove out of the county, the governor for the time being, with the ad-
vice and consent of the council, is hereby authorised to appoint and commission another
fit and proper person to fill such a vacancy.
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legislation sought to guarantee security. Nothing in the statute sug-
gested that the reform or the offices were temporary or required re-
newal. By choosing the language of "good behaviour" and assigning
no time limit to the office, the legislature created a freehold property
interest for each justice.0 In 1797, the legislature reaffirmed these
basic guidelines of "good behaviour."" Firmly in control of the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches, the Federalists began installing their
partisans in these new life-term positions. In February 1799, the Fed-
eralist governor appointed William Whittington chief justice of the
state's fourth district. The Republicans attacked this Federalist load-
ing of the judiciary, and complained that the bill increased the power
of the General Court to the detriment of popular control.
2. The General Court Judges and the Republican Victory in 1800
The three judges of the General Court were Federalist Jeremiah
Townley Chase, Federalist John Done, and Republican Gabriel Du-
vall. While they were judges on the General Court, Judge Chase and
Judge Duvall actually ran against one another as electors in the 1800
Presidential election, a degree of partisan campaigning by judges that
shocks the modern reader.33 That election was the political turning
point both in the nation and in Maryland, and Duvall's victory over
Chase was decisive.
Jeremiah Chase was Justice Samuel Chase's cousin, and the two
were very close." When Jeremiah lost his father at age nine, Samuel's
father Thomas took him in, and Samuel, then age sixteen, "assumed
the role of Jeremiah's older brother."3 Thomas educated them to-
gether, and both ventured on to parallel legal and judicial careers.
Samuel and Jeremiah married sisters Ann and Hester Baldwin, and
the Chases invested in the same large land deals from 1780 until
Id. § XVIII. In 1797, the legislature increased the chiefjustices' salaries, which was the only re-
form of the bill before 1801. A Supplement to the Act for the Better Administration ofJustice
in the Several Counties of the State Increases the Chief Justices' Yearly Salaries to $1300 (in the
Third District $1400), § II, ch. LXIX, in KILTY, supra note 28.
30 KILTY, supra note 28, at ch. XLIII. There was no time limit on the term of office held dur-
ing good behavior, so the office was for life, and thus, a freehold. In An Act for the Better Admini-
stration ofJustice in the Several Counties of the State, Section II redistricts the state into five judicial
districts. Section lV continues Chapter 33 section 4 of the Act of 1790 by the same title, which
provides that the chief justices and associate justices of the county. Section V designates one
chiefjustice and two associate justices for each county.
Whittington v. Polk, 2 H. &J. 236, 238 (Md. 1802).
32 Id. at 239.
M See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
JAMES HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE 6 (1980).
35Id
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Samuel's death in 1811. Jeremiah served on the five-member execu-
tive Council that appointed Samuel Chase as Maryland's agent and
negotiator with Britain in 1783, and then appointed Samuel to his
first judicial position in 1788. 7 Samuel and Jeremiah led the An-
tifederalist campaign in the state's convention on ratifying the U.S.
Constitution, staging an upset victory in their county. In 1791,
Samuel was appointed Chief Judge and Jeremiah Associate Judge of
the General Court, and they served together until 1796, when Samuel
became a Supreme Court Justice.I The two taught law students to-
gether in the 1790s,40 and together campaigned for John Adams in
1800, in part to position Jeremiah for an appointment to the federal.... 41
judiciary if Adams won. When Congress impeached Samuel in 1804,
Jeremiah assisted in his defense.42 Undoubtedly, Jeremiah and Sam-
uel Chase stayed in close contact throughout these years.
When Samuel Chase was elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court in
1796, Duvall was his replacement, after serving in Congress as a Re-
publican.43 In that same year, Duvall served as a presidential elector
for Thomas Jefferson. 4 Duvall and Jeremiah Chase served on the
General Court together for more than six years. In November 1802,
just five months after Duvall wrote his concurrence in Whittington, Jef-
ferson elevated Duvall to Comptroller of the U.S. Treasury, a sign
that Jefferson approved of the court's decision.4' Duvall would later
replace Samuel Chase on the U.S. Supreme Court in 1811.46
The 1800 election was the decisive political turn in the nation and
in Maryland, and Jeremiah Chase and Duvall were on the frontlines.
Both Federalists and Republicans had predicted that the state would
deliver a majority of its electors to John Adams, but to their surprise,
Maryland voters split the electoral vote, five to five.47  During the
Burr-Jefferson deadlock in the House, the state delegation again split
EDWARD C. PAPENFUSE ET AL., BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE MARYLAND LEGISLATURE,
1635-1789 213-16 (1985).
37 JANE S. ELSMEREJUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE 36 (1980); PAPENFUSE, supra note 36, at 213.
M HAW, supra note 34, at 149-50.
ELSMERE, supra note 37, at 44.
40 HAW, supra note 34, at 121.
41 ELSMERE supra note 37, at 128; HAW, supra note 34, at 207-08.
42 ELSMERE, supra note 37, at 233.
43 Irving Dilliard, Gabriel Duvall, in I THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1789-1978, at 422 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
44 BALT. AM.,July 1, 1800.
45 Dillard, supra note 43, at 423. See also infra note 214.
46 Some historians havejudged Duvall's tenure to be "utterly mediocre," and one considered
him "the most insignificant of all Supreme Court judges." E. BATES, STORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 109-10 (1936). See also David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 466 (1983) (arguing that Duvall was insignificant); but see Dilliard, supra note
43.
47 RISIORD, supra note 27, at 559.
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its vote, four to four, until the Federalists relented in the final rounds
by abstaining. 8 The electoral race in Baltimore pitted Chase, Chief
Judge of the General Court, as an elector for Adams and Pinckney,
against Duvall, Associate Judge of the General Court, as an elector for
Jefferson and Burr. Duvall played a pivotal role in defending Jeffer-
son against Federalist charges that he prematurely fled Richmond be-
fore a British advance in the Revolutionary War. Jefferson apprecia-
tively praised Duvall as a "Friend of the People" during the election.49
Duvall also published a series of campaign articles in favor of Jeffer-
son and his own candidacy as a Republican elector, in which he pri-
marily attacked the Alien and Sedition Acts. Jeremiah Chase re-
sponded with a series of hard-line articles that took a zealous pro-
Federalist stance on those acts and defended Adams unquestion-
ingly.
51
The dramatic political shift toward the Republicans was most ob-
vious in this electoral race. After years of oscillation, Baltimore deci-
sively returned to the Republican column. One historian recounts
that Duvall "swept every ward in the city," winning in many areas by
five-to-one or ten-to-one. A tally from the newspapers reveals that
Duvall defeated Chase by a margin of more than three to one.
These lopsided returns suggest that Jefferson probably would have
won Maryland's popular vote outright, and if the districts had not
been skewed to benefit the Federalists, he might have won a majority
of Maryland's electors rather than splitting them five-to-five. Before
Congress broke the Jefferson-Burr deadlock, Marylanders were al-
ready nominating Duvall for Secretary of the Treasury, and hailing
him as one who "has done more in the cause of Republicanism than
any man whatever."54
3. The Federalists'Midnight Appointment and the Republican "Ripper Bill"
The 1800 election demonstrated that the Maryland Republicans
were pulling ahead of the Federalists. The Republicans had a slight
edge in the House of Delegates in the 1800-01 session. The Federal-
48 Id.
49 PAPENFUSE, supra note 36, at 291. See also Judge Gabriel Duvall, MARLBOROUGH GAZETrE
(Gabriel Duvall Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
W BALT. AM., July 1, 8, 9, 15, 16, Aug. 19, 20, 1800; MD. GAZETrE, Aug. 14, 1800.
51 RENZULLI, supra note 27, at 216. MD. GAZETTE, Sept. 11, 1800.
52 RISJORD, supra note 27, at 559. Risjord also reports, "Chase made a showing (losing by 285
to 148) only in the first central ward, where most of the city's merchants resided. The Republi-
cans did best in the remote wards (winning by margins of five or ten to one) where the mechan-
ics and artisans lived." Id.
53 Duvall amassed 2,379 votes to Chase's 774 votes (approximately). MD. GAZETTE, Nov. 20,
1800.
BALT. AM. & COM. DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 2, 1801.
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ists clung to the state Senate, which was elected every fifth year, and
the voters would be choosing a new slate of Senate electors in Sep-
tember 1801. Aware that they could be losing control very soon, the
Federalists tried to shore up their control of the judiciary. When a
vacancy opened in the state's fifth judicial district, the Federalist gov-
ernor Benjamin Ogle appointed Congressman William Craik, which
one Federalist writer conceded in the midst of the repeal debate,
"this was among the last acts of that executive, and in analogy to the
last acts of Mr. Adams's administration has been called the 'midnight
appointment.' 5 This writer granted that Craik was "a firm federal
character, and that his appointment would excite the [Republican]
opposition... more than any other federal man the executive could
have selected.""" As the Federalists split between the Adams camp
and the Hamilton camp, Craik became a leader of the Maryland Ad-
ams camp-along with Samuel Chase and Jeremiah Chase. 7 Craik
was a devoted Federalist, although he cast blank ballots in the Jeffer-
son-Burr split when his wife threatened to divorce him if he voted
against Jefferson.5 Despite Craik's act of independence (or co-
dependence) in that electoral crisis, his selection created a "great and
distinguishing opposition," and "the irritation of the democrats burst
forth."59 As soon as Craik was commissioned, Republican leader
Montgomery vowed to "lay a resolution on the table of the House of
Representatives to repeal the law, to get rid of the judge-That he
would present a precedent to the general [Federal] government,
which he trusted they would imitate. ''v. From this Federalist account,
both the "midnight" appointment of Craik and the Republican re-
sponse were partisan maneuvers. This account also suggests that,
from the beginning, the Maryland Republicans were fighting this bat-
tle as a precedent for the unfolding national struggle over the Mid-
nightJudges and the Federal judiciary.
As the Federalists had feared, the fall of 1801 brought a very dif-
ferent slate of Senate electors, and they delivered a two-to-one Repub-
lican majority in the Senate.61 In that same election, the Republicans
strengthened their grip on the House of Delegates, with a strong
55"Fellow Citizen," To Mr. Wright of the Senate of the United States, WASH. FEDERALIST, Feb. 9,
1802.
56 Id.
.5 RENZULL1, supra note 27, at 220.
Id. at 226-27.
5' "Fellow Citizen," To Mr. Wright of the Senate of the United States, WASH. FEDERALIST, Feb. 9,
1802.
60 Id. In the summer of 1801, a Federalist sympathizer observed that the Federalists had
made the judiciary a polarizing partisan issue, which was foolish, considering how the party bal-
ance was shifting. Letter from William Pinkney to Ninian Pinkney (July 21, 1801), in THE LIFE
OF WILLIAM PINKNEY 38-39 (Rev. William Pinkney ed., DeCapo Press 1969).
6 RISJORI), supra note 27, at 563-65.
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margin of 45 to 28.62 When the assembly met in November, the Re-
publicans were determined to extend their revolution from the legis-
lature to all the branches of government. 6' They selected Republican
John Francis Mercer as Governor !Y more than a two-to-one majority
over the Federalist James Murray. The next order of business was
filling the state's open Senate seat in Congress. The Federalists had
attempted to fill the seat in the previous session of 1800-01, but the
Republicans blocked their moves, confident that they would control
the next legislature. By a vote of 60 to 26 in November 1801, the Re-
publicans gave the seat to their candidate Robert Wright.6 After in-
creasing funding for their press and enacting electoral reform, the
Republicans then turned to the judiciary. Political scientist Norman
Risjord concluded that the Maryland Republican's orchestrated
agenda and uniform voting discipline "marks the ultimate maturity of
the first party system. ' 66
The Republicans drafted a repeal of the 1796 Act that reformed
the judiciary and created offices for Federalist appointees. 67 Then
they immediately recreated the exact same judicial system, but with a
clean slate ready to be filled in with Republican appointees. Section
1 of the 1801 Maryland Act recreated the same five districts found in
Section II of the 1796 Act,68 and other sections repeated the repealed
act verbatim, including the clauses guaranteeing the commissions
"during good behaviour."69 This legislation was known as a "ripper
bill," strippingJudges from office simply to create vacancies for new
appointments. In Congress, the Republicans offered a rationale
that the Judiciary Act of 1801 needed to be scrapped because it was
unnecessary and expensive, and they followed through by scrapping
it. In Maryland there was little such pretense. The Maryland Repub-
licans proved in reenacting the same system that their motives were
62 Id. at 565 (Risjord classifies five other delegates as independents).
63 Id. at 563.
64 BALT. AM., Nov. 9, 1801 (reporting the vote as 59 to 27). The next day, the legislature
appointed only Republicans to the Governor's Council, with more than a two-to-one margin in
each case. BALT. AM., Nov. 13, 1801.
RISJORD, supra note 27, 564.
66 Id. at 572.
67 ELIS, supra note 3, at 243-44.
68 MD. GAZETtE,Jan. 14, 1802.
Section 3 of the 1801 Act provides, verbatim from Section IV of the 1796 Act, that the
chief justices and associate justices "shall hold their commission during good behaviour, and
may be removed for misbehaviour in the same manner as the chancellor and the judges may be
removed agreeably to the constitution of this state, and not otherwise." Section 4 repeats the
same designation from Section V of the 1796 Act, which designated one chief justice and two
associate justices for each county. And similarly, Section 15 copies from Section XVIII of the
1796 Act, limiting the circumstances of replacement of the justices. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 14,
1802; KILIY, supra note 28, at ch. XLIII.
70 CLARKSON &JETT, supra note 3, at 198.
Oct. 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONS TJI'TIONAL LAW
purely partisan.7' Perhaps because of its legally dubious design, the
repeal passed by only six votes, which was much closer than the votes
on other partisan issues of the session."
According to several Federalist news stories, Montgomery of Har-
ford, a Republican leader in the state House and the primary sponsor
of the repeal, aimed to dismiss particular Federalist justices, but un-
derstood that the "good behaviour" clause made this task open to le-
gal challenges. According to a Federalist newspaper report, Mont-
gomery declared that he sought to "vacate a very unpopular
appointment [of Craik] made in the expiring moments of the late
executive," and he introduced a resolution condemning the ap-
pointment. The paper noted that the Maryland constitution permit-
ted the removal only of officers without a "during good behaviour"
commission, and that Craik's office was protected from repeal be-
cause the 1796 act created a valid "good behaviour" commission.74 A
Federalist writer claimed that Montgomery understood that "the con-
stitution of Maryland had no provision that would embrace the facts
influencing the wish of removal, [and] that therefore the law of 1796
must be repealed, for that purpose." 7 Montgomery emphasized the
parallels between Maryland's midnight Justices and Adams's Mid-
night Judges. Montgomery explained that the legislature's repeal
had a popular mandate from the state election, and that the state was
sending a message to the federal government and the nation about
Adams' Judiciary Act of 1801.7
In the midst of the Maryland legislative debate, President Jeffer-
son, who had already indicated that he intended to remove the Mid-
night Judges, delivered a Congressional address in December 1801
suggesting a revision or repeal of the Judiciary Act.77 When the bill
took effect on January 26, 1802, Republican Governor Mercer ap-
pointed William Polk and two other Republicans 7 to replace the old
71 A clerk in the Maryland legislature reported that some delegates felt that the judicial sys-
tem was "inconvenient, productive of delay, and very expensive." NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Dec.
30, 1801. These arguments appear to be a pretense, especially after the legislattre recreated
the same court structure.
72 On December 17, the Maryland House of Delegates voted 39 to 33 for the bill. BALT.
REPUBLICAN, Mar. 8, 1802.73 "Fellow Citizen," To Mr. Wright of the Senate of the United States, WASH. FEDERALIST, Feb. 9,
1802.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 From Annapolis, BALT. AM., Nov. 13, 1801.
77 ELIS, supra note 3, at 41 (emphasizing the moderation of Jefferson's message); BALT.
AM., Dec. 10, 1801.
78 The two other Republican appointees were William Clagett and Richard Sprigg. Sprigg
had served in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Republican in the 1790s. RENZULLI, supra
note 27, at 188. As an interesting side note, GovernorJohn Mercer married the daughter of
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Federalist justices, including William Whittington and William
Craik. 79 On February 8, 1802, Polk assumed the office of chief justice
of the fourth district-and according to Whittington's lawyers, he
"disseised" Whittington "of his freehold."8 On March 24, 1802, Whit-
tington brought a writ of assize of novel disseisin, and the General
Court held the trial on April 7, 1802.81 One indication of the impor-
tance of this trial was the prominence of Whittington's counsel. He
was represented by two Federalist congressmen: Luther Martin, one
of the framers of the Constitution, and Robert Goodloe Harper, one
of the leaders of the Federalist Party.82 The significance of Whitting-
ton's counsel was not lost on the media, who reported the names of
William Whittington's counsel to convey the case's national impor-
tance. 3 According to a Republican paper, Harper "ascrib[ed] the
worst of views to have actuated the authors of the law," and he sought
to "impress on the minds of the weak, that they had arrived at the
precipice of destruction, and that the ruling faction were hurling
them in ruin, in a style truly picturesque of Sam Chase."' After the
General Court judges found a way to avert political trouble at this
precipice of their destruction, Justice Samuel Chase would later seize
his own forum to attack the "ruling faction" and their judicial re-
forms, putting himself on the precipice of impeachment and convic-
tion.
C. Politicians and the Media Respond
1. Congress and the Media
Maryland's repeal and the subsequent litigation drew national at-
tention from politicians, the media, and the Supreme Court Justices.
Observers understood that this was the first round of the country-
wide judiciary fight, setting the stage for the national repeal. Con-
gress scrutinized Maryland's actions in January 1801 during the de-
bate over the repeal of the Federal Judiciary Act. Senator James Hill-
house, a Federalist from Connecticut and an opponent of the repeal,
Richard Sprigg, Sr. FRANK F. WHITE, JR., THE GOVERNORS OF MARYLAND, 1777-1970, at 47
(1970)
79 "Fellow Citizen," To Mr. Wright of the Senate of the United States, WASH. FEDERALIST, Feb. 9,
1802.
so Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. &J. 236, 239 (Md. 1802). The term "disseised" is used in the
context of the assize of novel disseisin, referring to the seizing of another's property.
81 Id. at 236.
82 CLARKSON &JETT, supra note 3, at 200-01.
83 PITTSFIELD SUN (Mass.), reprinted in INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 6, 1802.
Read! Assize of Novel Disseisin, BALT. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN, June 24, 1802. Luther Mar-
tin, it reported, was more moderate, while the defendant's counsel, Thomas James Bullitt and
Josiah Bailey were "pertinent and pointed" and more convincing to thejury. Id.
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observed that legislatures may alter their court systems, but "no judge
[holding office 'in good behavior'] shall be deprived of his office or
salary. ' '& He then condemned Maryland's revisions from the previous
month:
To abolish a court, without destroying the office or salary of the judge,
has not in practice been found difficult. Most of the States, where judges
hold their offices during good behaviour, have been in the habit of doing
it; ... but in no instance has ajudge been deprived of his office or salary,
unless in that stated to have recently... reported, ought not to be re-
spected, much less imitated by the Senate. By the law of Maryland, courts
had been established, and judges appointed, who, by the Constitution,
hold their offices during good behaviour. This law was repealed, and,
during the same session of the Legislature, a new law was passed estab-
lishing the same courts, and almost in the same words of the fornmer law.
What could be the object of this repeal? Surely none other than the
turning the judges out of office. Could that be less a violation of their
Constitution than the passing of a law directly removing from office the
same judges? It is too absurd to say that indirect means may be used to ef-
fect what might not be done by a direct and positive law, or is absolutely
forbidden by the Constitution to be done at all.
Senator Robert Wright of Maryland responded on the Senate floor
"to defend the State he had an honor to represent from the unkind
imputation of a 'violation of her Constitution."'8 7 Wright had just
been appointed by the state legislature to the U.S. Senate, and, ac-
cording to a Federalist account, he had been present during the legis-
lature's repeal."' Wright then offered many of the stock arguments
for the Federal repeal, which also applied to Maryland's repeal. 9
Four days later, Senator Wright returned to the floor to defend the
Maryland Republicans. He explained that his state initially appointed
justices of the peace annually, but this system was impractical and
failed to attract enough qualified candidates.9 0 In response, the legis-
lature created a new system of justices for county courts appointed by91
the law during good behavior. Senator Wright portrayed this re-
form as limited and impermanent: "[B]ut this law being like all new
laws, a measure of experiment, was limited to a short duration, and
has been from time to time continued. At the last session ... the law
was repealed, and a new law passed embracing the proposed
amendments. "9" However, the 1796 reform law contained no indica-
M 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 108 (1802).
W Id. at 108-09.
87 Id. at 110.
8 "Fellow Citizen," WASH. FEDERALIST, Feb. 15, 1801.
11 ANNALSOF CONG. 110-11 (1802).
W 11 ANNALS OFCONG. 137 (1802).
91 Id.
92 Id.
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tion that it was considered temporary. Wright also claimed that the
repeal was not motivated by partisanship, because the Republicans
appointed two judges under the new law:
[B] oth of them were judges under the old law, and both were Federal-
ists-Mr. Ridgely, formerly a Republican, latterly a Federalist; Mr.
Tilghman, always a Federalist .... From this view it must appear, that
our Government, which is truly Republican, was not impelled by the un-
worthy motives that have been ascribed to her, and that Federalists of
merit where they can be found are treated there with respect.
93
Wright also pointed out that the Maryland Federalists had set a
precedent for the re~eal in 1791 when they sought to oust Samuel
Chase, of all people. At that time, Chase had been a zealous anti-
Federalist, but he switched a few years later-what stayed consistent
was his zeal. Chase had been appointed to the criminal court, and
held a commission "during good behaviour" as established by the
state legislature. After the Federalists failed in their attempt to im-
peach Chase, they "repealed the law, and renewed it 'totidem verbis."' 95
However, the governor simply renewed Samuel Chase's commission,
"but, at the next session, so fixed were the Federalists on their pur-
pose, that they repealed that section of the law that related to the
judges, and amended it, that 'the district judge should be the judge
of the criminal court,' and thus dismissed Mr. Chase, the obnoxious
judge.9 6 He believed that the Federalists' revocation of a "good be-
haviour" commission in 1791 was a precedent for the constitutionality
of the Republican repeal in 1801.
97
The Maryland controversy gained a national audience that win-
ter, as newspapers around the country covered the state's repeal.9
The National Intelligencer printed Senator Wright's defense of the re-
peal, and the Federalist press soon rebutted Wright's arguments.9
Federalist newspapers in Philadelphia and Providence compared the
Maryland repeal to the Federal debate over repeal, and angrily ob-
jected to the Republicans' brazenness. These reports noted that the
Congressional Republicans "expressly acknowledged that the Consti-
tution denies to the Legislature the power of changing a system of
Judicature, merely for the purpose of getting rid of obnoxious
93 Id.
9 Id. at 137-38.
95 Id. at 138.
9 Id.
97Id.
98 See, e.g., GAZETTE OF THE U.S. (Philadelphia), Jan. 25, 1802; U.S. CHRON. (Providence),
Feb. 11, 1802; "A Marylander," WASH. FEDERALIST, Dec. 31, 1801; NATL INTELLIGENCER (Wash-
ington), Dec. 30, 1801.
99"Fellow Citizen," WASH. FEDERALIST, Feb. 9 & Feb. 15, 1801.
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Judges," and at least offered policy arguments to justify their repeal.'/°
But these papers noted that the Maryland Republicans had broken
this rule:
They do not even attempt to improve the system, but have repealed the
law which established the system, and having thereby . . . turned out
those judges which the Constitution declared independent, have re-
enacted the same law! Such is the security afforded by written Constitutions,
when Jacobins are to legislate under them! °0
The Washington Federalist also reported that the 1801 bill "was the
copy, verbatim of the law of 1796, except the clause repealing that
law."'O° This commentator continued, "[t]he repeal and immediate
restitution of the law must have been predic [a] ted on the removal of
the judges.""3 According to these writers, Maryland's repeal showed
the true partisan motivations behind all of the judiciary revisions, and
served as a warning about the Jeffersonians' danger to the Constitu-
tion. "A Marylander," writing in the Washington Federalist, which has
been linked by some to John Marshall, also protested against the bill's
unconstitutionality, but he offered an optimistic prediction. Relying
on the "during good behaviour" clauses in the 1796 law, "A Mary-
lander" believed the Federalist case was clear and posed "no diffi-
culty," and warned that "this encroachment [was] of most dangerous
tendency" of Republican abuses."" After noting that the "old judges
compose the only legal courts" (i.e., only Federalist judges), he con-
cluded, "I am confident that the courts of Maryland will have firm-
ness and independence" to overturn the repeal and restore the Fed-
eralistjustices.
Meanwhile, the Republicans were equally sanguine. One Repub-
lican in Maryland wrote to a Maryland Congressman, "You have no
doubt heard that Mr. Whittington has sued Judge Polk + that the trial
was likely to come this term of the General Court. The Federalists
seem determined to die in the last ditch, rather than submit . .. ."06
Expectations were high, and the stakes were high, for the case was a
potential springboard for the Justices to launch their counterstrike-
or a potential setback before a national audience.
RX GAZETE OF THE U.S. (Philadelphia), Jan. 25, 1802; U.S. CHRON. (Providence), Feb. 11,
1802.
WI U.S. CHRON. (Providence), Feb. 11, 1802 (emphasis in original).
1w "Fellow Citizen," WASH. FEDERALIST, Feb. 15, 1802.
103 Id.
I's "A Marylander," WASH. FEDERALIST, Dec. 31, 1801.
105 Id.
Icf Letter from Edward Hopper to Joseph Nicholson (Apr. 17, 1802), in 2 JOSEPH NICHOLSON
PAPERS (on file with the Library of Congress). Joseph Nicholson was the legendary Republican
who, despite being severely ill, traveled through a snowstorm to Congress in order to block
Maryland's delegation from supporting Aaron Burr. RENZULLI, supra note 27, at 226.
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2. The Supreme Court Justices
In March 1802, around the time that William Whittington filed his
petition to the General Court, the Republican Congress repealed the
Judiciary Act of 1801, terminating the Midnight Judges' offices and
the new circuit system, and then reinstated the old system, in which
the Justices rode the circuits themselves.' 7 Because Congress had
also suspended the next two Supreme Court terms, the Justices would
not be able to hear a challenge to the repeal until February 1803, and
they faced a difficult decision about whether to ride circuit or to boy-
cott, in deference to Adams' appointments of January 1801. just
when the General Court held its trial in Whittington v. Polk in April,
the Supreme Court justices were in the middle of their tense discus-
sions about a boycott.
The Federalist Congressional leaders began organizing an aggres-
sive resistance to the repeal of the Judiciary Act. In late March, the
Federalists learned some exciting news: Marshall would cooperate
fully with their plans. One Congressman visited John Marshall in
Richmond and reported "that the firmness of the Supreme Court
may be depended on should the business be brought before 'em.
This report spread quickly among the Federalist leadership, and they
grew more emboldened. On April 6, Marshall wrote to Justice
Paterson that he personally opposed riding circuit and wished that
the Court would have an opportunity to hear a challenge to the r e-
peal:
I confess I have some strong constitutional scruples. I cannot well per-
ceive how the performance of circuit duty by the Judges of the supreme
court can be supported. If the question was new I should be unwilling to
act in this character without a consultation of the Judges; but I consider it
as decided & that whatever my own scruples may be I am bound by the
decision. I cannot however but regret the loss of the next June term. I
could have wished the 11udges had convened before they proceeded to
execute the new system.
107 Repeal Act, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (1802); An Act To Amend the Judicial System of the United
States, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156 (1802).
1 Letter from John Rutledge tojames A. Bayard (March 26, 1802), in COLLERYCOLLECTION
(on file with the Historical Society of Delaware).
109 Probably hearing this same message from Ross, Gouverneur Morris noted in his diary on
April 5 that "Mr. Ross calls to tell me he is advised that the ChiefJustice is disposed to go quite
as far as we could wish." Diary of Gouverneur Morris (Apr. 5, 1802), in GOUvAERNEUR MORRIS
PAPERS (on file with the Library of Congress). Holt mistakenly cites this passage to April 6 of
the diary. See Wythe Holt, "[lf the Courts have firnness enough to render the decision ".- Eglert Benson
and the Protest of the "Midnight Judges" Against Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, in WYrHI HOLT &
DAvID A. NOURsE, EGBERT BENSON, FIRST CHIEFJUDGE OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1801-1802) 10
(1987) (describing the Federalist plans as "buoyed by the report from Richmond").
11 Letter from Chief Justice John Marshall to Justice William Paterson (Apr. 5, 1802), in 6
THE PAPERS OFJOHN MARSHALL 106 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1990).
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True to his leadership as Chief Justice, Marshall valued judicial con-
sensus for Court decisions, but his personal feelings about the boycott
and about the law are very revealing. These letters began a series of
exchanges about the boycott plans. Justices Cushing, Paterson, and
Washington preferred to ride circuit and avoid confrontation, while
Justice Chase argued strongly for the boycott.
In his own letter to Justice Paterson on April 6, Chase argued that
the Justices should stand by their principles, despite the conse-
quences. He then explicitly mentioned Whittington v. Polk, which was
to be argued the very next day:
I expect we shall hear from our ChiefJustice in about a fortnight. I hope
we shall meet and consult. I believe a Day of severe trial is fast approach-
ing for the friends of the Constitution, and we I fear must be principle
actors, and may be sufferers therein. In this State an assize of office is
brought by Judge Whittington vs. Judge Polk to try the constitutionality
of the act of our Legislature repealing our District Law. I would write to
you fully my Sentiments, as far as I have formed an opinion, but I fear
some accident. I will only say, if the office of the CircuitJudge is full, and
it is so if not taken away by the repealing act, We are to be made the in-
struments to destroy the independence of theJudiciary. 1
Chase regarded Whittington as an important test case that would in-
fluence the course of events. Despite his cryptic concerns about
"some accident," he was quite certain that the Supreme Court Justices
had no legal right to ride circuit. Chase was invoking Whittington be-
cause first, he was optimistic that the case would be decided for the
Federalists, and second, he saw it as a strong precedent against their
riding circuit. At that point in the Justices' discussions, he was trying
to influence the more reluctant associates, and he thought Whitting-
ton would soon be strong ammunition for his case.
In an even more adamant letter to Chief Justice Marshall two
weeks later, Chase again mentioned an "assize of office"-the same
writ he referred to in his letter to Paterson in discussing Whitting-
ton's case-as the key to the Court's chance to void the repeal.
If the constitutionality of this Act could be brought before the Supreme
Court, by an action of assize of office, or by action to recover the Salary, I
should decide (as at present advised) that the Act is void; and I would by
the first action restore the Judge to his Office, and by the latter, adjudge
him his Salary.
l"2
H Letter from Justice Samuel Chase to Justice William Paterson (Apr. 6, 1802), in WILLIAM
PATERSON PAPERS (on file in the MSS Room (Lenox), New York Public Library).
112 Letter from Justice Samuel Chase to Chief Justice John Marshall (April 24, 1802), reprinted
in GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL,
1801-15, at 174-75 (1981):
[B]ut by neither of these modes, nor by any other (as Mandamus or Quo Warranto)
could remedy be obtained. [The ultimate holding of Marbury]. This defect of remedy to
obtain a Right (whichJustice abhors) will induce every Judge of the Supreme Court to act
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At about the same time, Chief Justice Marshall informed the
Federalist leadership, much to their disappointment, that the Justices
had decided to ride circuit.11 From this setback, the Federalist lead-
ers in Congress and the MidnightJudges formulated a plan to contest
the Justices' jurisdiction in riding circuit that autumn. ' The Justices
did not stop debating their decision, and even expressed some re-
grets about the situation."5 As of June 8, Chase was still willing to
fight.
116
On June 14, the Maryland General Court announced its decision.
Considering the court's Federalist majority and William Whitting-
ton's apparently strong legal case, one would expect the two Federal-
istjudges, Chase and Done, to vote to strike down the 1801 repeal,
and one, the Republican Duvall, to dissent. As discussed in Subsec-
tion I.B.2, Jeremiah Townley Chase and Gabriel Duvall were ex-
tremely active campaigners for the Federalists and Republicans,
respectively." 7 The third judge, John Done, established his commit-
ment to the Federalists as an elector for John Adams in the 1796
presidential election,"8 and his continuing allegiance to the Federal-
ists was publicly known." 9 Instead, the court unanimously rejected
the Federalist challenges. Was this an act of impartiality and fair
judging? Moderation? Or calculated capitulation?
II. WHITINGTON V. POLK
A. The Decision
As the opening salvo in the judicial battle over Federalist ap-
pointments, Whittington paralleled the facts of Marbury and Stuart v.
with the greatest caution; and he must, in myjudgement, decline to execute the office of
a CircuitJudge, if he apprehends, that he shall, thereby, violate the Constitutional Rights
of the CircuitJudges.
Id.
u1 Letter from James A. Bayard to Richard Bassett (Apr. 24, 1802), in BAYARD PAPERS (on file
with the Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, MD); Letter from James A. Bayard to Alexan-
der Hamilton (Apr. 25, 1802), in 25 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 613-14 (Harold C. Syrett
ed., 1977); Diary of Gouverneur Morris (Apr. 24, 1805) in GOUVERNEUR MORRIS PAPERS (on file
with the Library of Congress).
114 Holt, supra note 109, at 110-11.
115 HASKINS &JOHNSON, supra note 112, at 177 (citing a letter from William Cushing to Wil-
liam Paterson (May 29, 1802), in MISCELLANEOUS MANUSCRIPTS, WILLIAM CUSHING (on file with
the New York Historical Society, New York City)).
116 Id.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54. The conflicts were not just political. Jeremiah
Chase held mortgages on the property of Luther Martin, the Federalist lawyer representing Wil-
liam Whittington. PAPENFUSE, supra note 36, at 213.
118 PAPENFUSE, supra note 36, at 273-74. John Done married William Polk's niece Patience
Bayly. Id.
n- PITFSFIELD SUN (Mass.), reprinted in INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 6, 1802.
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Laird very closely on the state level, except for the fact that the Mary-
land Federalists had an even stronger claim. Unlike Marbury and
President Adams's other midnight appointments, William Whitting-
ton received a judicial appointment in 1799, in the midst of a Feder-
alist mandate, and thus, his office was untainted by "lame duck" ille-
gitimacy. Unlike Marbury's five-year limited term as a Justice of the
Peace, William Whittington's office was held during good behavior
without any term limit, and thus it was a freehold property interest.
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Maryland General Court was con-
trolled by Federalist judges, but unlike the Supreme Court, the Mary-
land General Court had the original jurisdictional power to return
offices to their rightful owners. The only major legal or political issue
for which Whittington had a weaker claim than Adams's "midnight
appointments" was that his office had been created by the legislature,
not the state constitution. At the same time, Marbury's commission
was also legislative, and yet the Marshall Court was willing to recog-
nize that this commission was irrevocable vested property.
Despite these advantages for the Federalists, the Maryland court
rebuffed their arguments in June 1802, and cloaked its judicial sur-
render to the Republicans with mere dicta about judicial review.
Judge Jeremiah Chase held, "1st. That an act of assembly repugnant
to the constitution is void. 2d. That the court have [sic] a right to de-
termine an act of assembly void, which is repugnant to the constitu-
tion.' 12" Then for four pages of dicta, he touted the power of judicial
review. His strongest statements:
The legislature, being the creature of the constitution, and acting within
a circumscribed sphere, is not omnipotent, and cannot rightfully exercise
any power, but that which is derived from that instrument.1
2 1
The power of determining finally on the validity of the acts of the legisla-
ture cannot reside with the legislature, because such power would defeat
and render nugatory, all the limitations and restrictions on the authority
of the legislature, contained in the bill of rights and form of government,
and they would become judges of the validity of their own acts, which
would establish a despotism, and subvert that great principle of the con-
stitution, which declares that the powers of making, judging, and execut-
ing the law, shall be separate and distinct from each other.
It is the office and province of the court to decide all questions of law
which are judicially brought before them .... and to determine whether
an act of the legislature, which assumes the appearance of a law, and is
clothed with the garb of authority, is made pursuant to the power vested
by the constitution in the legislature; for if it is not the result or emana-
12 Whittington v. Polk, I H. &J. 236, 241-42 (Md. 1802).
121 Id. at 242.
122 Id. at 243.
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tion of authority derived from the constitution, it is not law, and cannot
influence the judgment of the court in the decision of the question be-
fore them.'
These passages are the reason that Whittington is cited as a foundation
for American judicial supremacy. Chase wrote, " [W] henever it does
become necessary [to decide the constitutionality of legislation, the
people] trust they [the judges] will not seek any evasion, or shrink
from the determination of it, but act with caution and circumspec-
tion, and give it that consideration which the importance of it, and
their duty, demand." 24 In fact, the General Court erred considerably
on the side of caution-and indeed, they did evade and shrink from
their judicial duty. Sharply qualifying his bold pronouncements of
judicial supremacy, Judge Chase pointed out that this power of review
was limited by political interests and a responsibility not to disrupt or
undermine the government without sufficient cause:
It is true the people may assume the powers of government whenever the
ends of it are perverted, when public liberty is manifestly endangered,
and all other means of redress are ineffectual; but surely every act of the
legislature repugnant to, or in violation of the constitution, cannot be
held a sufficient cause for the interposition of the people in a way which
subverts the government and reduces the people to a state of nature, and
therefore cannot be the proper mode of redress to remedy the evils re-
sulting from an act passed in violation of the constitution.1
5
Thus, even if a law is unconstitutional, the rights at stake may not be
significant enough to warrant judicial intervention. The court feared
that judicial review carries the risk of "subvert[ing]" the govern-
ment-and in this case, the judges avoided that risk.
After his lengthy disquisition on judicial review, Judge Chase then
turned to the more direct questions of the case: whether the repeal of
1801 was constitutional, and whether the assize of novel disseisin was
the proper remedy. Chase began by dodging the question of motives
of the repeal: The motives "cannot be inquired into by the court in a
question as to its constitutionality.' 26 But Judge Chase never men-
tioned that the legislature reinstated the same court system immedi-
ately after the repeal, which was clear evidence of the Republicans'
unacceptable partisan motive. Chase first focused on the weakest of
the plaintiff arguments: that 'justices" qualified as judges under the
Maryland Constitution, and therefore could be commissioned during
good behaviour. Chase reviewed the provisions of the Maryland Con-
stitution that guaranteed all judges commissions "during good behav-
123 Id. at 244.
124 Id. at 246.
127 Id. at 243.
12 Id. at 246.
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iour," and noted that all other civil officers who "do not hold com-
missions during good behaviour" shall be appointed annually. 27
Jeremiah Chase then pointed out that from 1777 until the reform act,
justices of the peace were annually appointed, and could be duly dis-
charged.
[T]he plain and obvious meaning of that instrument [the state Constitu-
tion], [is] that the justices of the county courts were not entitled to
commissions during good behaviour. A plain distinction is kept up be-
tween the justices of the county courts and the judges of the other courts,
and a studied uniformit% s of language has been observed throughout to
preserve the distinction.
Judge Jeremiah Chase granted that the general assembly had the
power to "modify" the county courts, but they could not create a life
tenure office that endured beyond the life of the legislation. Though
Whittington had "a right vested" in the office, that right lasted only
"for the term of years limited for the continuance of the law." Curi-
ously, Chase blasted the repeal as "an infraction of his right," as well
as "incompatible with the principles of justice, and does not accord
with sound legislation."'9 Nevertheless, the repeal was constitutional:
[T] he said office, and the right to hold it, being created by act of assem-
bly, and not vested in the plaintiff by the constitution, and there being no
clause or article in the bill of rights or form of government prohibiting or
restricting the legislature in passing the said repealing act, the court are
of the opinion that the said act is not void. m
Chase's implicit theory is that "good behaviour" meant one thing
in a constitutional context: life tenure, with removal solely for misbe-
haviour. It meant another thing in a legislative context: tenure for
the term of the legislation, with removal for misbehaviour or by re-
peal of the legislative act itself. But if the legislature could simply re-
peal a bill and reinstate the exact same bill in order to remove certain
justices, how was the term "good behaviour" meaningful in any legal
or practical sense? If the repeal indeed was an "infraction" of Whit-
tington's rights, as Chase granted in his opinion, why was there no
remedy? Was Chase intentionally writing imprecisely to offer some
sympathy for the plaintiff? Or was he revealing his own feelings of
conflict, or even of regret?
Finally, Judge Chase briefly turned to the question of remedy, the
writ of assize of novel disseisin. He concluded that the writ did not lie,
because Whittington's office was "only an interest for a term of years
in the said office, determinable on the contingency of his being con-
127 Id. at 247 (citing sections XL and XLIX of the MD. CONST. of 1776).
12 Id. at 248.
'' Id. at 249.
IM Id.
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victed of misbehaviour in a court of law; and that writ is not adapted
to the recovery of any estate or interest ... in an office less than a
freehold .. . ." " Chase noted only one exception to this rule, but
explained that it bore no similarity to Whittington's case, and thus
there was no way for the court to extend the writ by equity.32 Essen-
tially, this question of remedy begs the question of constitutionality.
If the legislature had the power to create offices "during good behav-
iour" as life tenure, not subject to repeal or removal (except for mis-
behavior), then the repeal would be unconstitutional, and the justice
would have a freehold right to the office. But as Judge Chase ruled,
the legislature did not have the power to create such offices that
would survive beyond the acts that created them. As a result, the of-
fice was not a freehold, and not subject to the assize, and thus, the
repeal was constitutional.
Judge Duvall concurred in the opinion, except the passage in
which Judge Chase decried the repeal as an "infraction" of the plain-
tiffs right and as "incompatible with the principles ofjustice." Duvall
complained that these observations were "partly erroneous and partly
extrajudicial."'33  While Duvall primarily objected to recognizing
Whittington's legal right to the office, his dissent implicitly flagged
the inconsistency between recognizing such a right and then declin-
ing to remedy an infraction of that right.
This fully articulated argument for judicial supremacy so soon be-
fore Marbury has been cited by state courts as a major precedent for
judicial supremacy and as a forerunner to Marbury. Whittington has
also caught the attention of several legal historians in several eras. In
1885, an article in the American Law Review, the most important legal
periodical at the time, credited Whittington as one of the foundational
cases "assert[ing] and enforc[ing]" judicial review. 35 James Bradley
Thayer's widely influential article in 1893, which established the
"clear mistake" rule for judicial review, cited Whittington as one of the
origins of American judicial review." In one of the most important
books on judicial power in America, Charles Grove Haines empha-
sized the dicta of judicial supremacy in Whittington, and he placed it
in the context of being a forerunner for Marbury. A more recent
131 Id. at 249-50.
132 Id. The exception is the case of elegit (ajudgment of debt, damages or forfeiture).
M Id. at 251.
13 See, e.g., Att'y Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929 (Md. 1981); Perkins v. Eskridge, 366
A.2d 21 (Md. 1976); Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, 848 & n.9 (Md. 1975);Jones v. Freeman,
146 P.2d 564 (Okla. 1943).
13 Meigs, supra note 3, at 185.
136 Thayer, supra note 3, at 140.
137 HAINES, supra note 3, at 106-08.
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study by Robert Clinton Lowry adopted the same perspective.'9 Per-
haps the most sweeping statement of Whittington's influence appeared
in a biography on Luther Martin, one of the Federalist lawyers in the
case: "The importance of this decision lies in the fact that Martin's
arguments persuaded the [Supreme] Court to write an ominion
which was followed in detail a year later in Marbuy v. Madison." 
99
B. The Response
Soon after the decision, politicians on both sides discussed the
opinion and its political significance. The zealous Virginia Con-
gressman John Randolph gleefully mocked the Federalist argument
that the county 'justices" created by the legislature were the same as
the 'judges" established by the state constitution. Randolph then
remarked that it was fitting that these judges on the General Court
had "disclaim [ed] all connection with Justice," and that they deserved
impeachment for the "usurpation of sovereignty to pronounce on the
constitutionality of law."' This extreme reaction foreshadowed
Randolph's hard-line leadership in the impeachment and conviction
of Judge Pickering, and then in the impeachment of Justice Chase.
On the other side of the aisle, Federalists grumbled about the Whit-
tington opinion. Charles Carroll, writing to Robert Goodloe Harper,
a Federalist Congressman who was one of Whittington's lawyers, re-
gretted the court's decision that the law was constitutional, but also
expressed some satisfaction that the judges had "so forcibly expressed
their disapprobation of the motives in which it originated."
1 4
1
The press immediately publicized the opinion, with prominent
area papers (including the Baltimore Democratic Republican, the Mary-
land Gazette, and the Washington Federalist) covering their front page
with the entire text of the decision. 42 The Baltimore Democratic Repub-
lican added in its editorial section, "We crave the particular attention
of our readers to the important law document which we this day pub-
lish-Whittington versus Polk."' 43 The National Intelligencer, a moder-
18 CLINTON, supra note 3, at 76-77 & 76 n.95 (1989).
1, CLARKSON &JET, supra note 3, at 200. Richard Ellis had a more balanced view of Whit-
tington: "[T]he General Court, desirous of avoiding direct confrontation with the Republican
controlled legislature, declared the law constitutional." However, Ellis discussed the case for
only four paragraphs, without delving into more of the background of the case and without
questioning the legal basis for the decision. ELLIS, supra note 3, at 244.
140 Letter from John Randolph to Joseph Nicholson (july 25, 1802), in SHIPPEN PAPERS (on
file in the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
141 Letter from Charles Carroll to Robert Goodloe Harper (June 15, 1802), in ROBERT
GOODLOE HARPER PAPERS (on file with the Maryland Historical Society).
142 BALT. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN, June 22, 1802; id.,June 24, 1802; MD. GAZETE, June 24,
1802; WASH. FEDERALIST, June 30, 1802.
143 BALT. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICANJune 22, 1802.
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ate Republican newspaper in Washington, reported only the pro-
Republican holding, and not the pro-judicial review dicta. The
judges, it reported, "were unanimously of the opinion that the law of
the last session was not unconstitutional; they were further of the
opinion, that the office of Mr. Whittington, the ex-judge, was not for
life, and that therefore an assize of novel disseisin... did not lie.'4
Two days later, the Baltimore Democratic Republican ran two articles
on the decision. The first recalled the arguments and the demeanor
of the attorneys before the General Court in April 1802.145 The sec-
ond celebrated the Whittington decision as a triumph by the Republi-
cans in the national judiciary battle. This article, titled "Judiciary,"
pointed out more than once that a majority of the General Court
judges were Federalists, and therefore, the Federalists expected to
prevail and "swelled with confident certainty that the law would be
pronounced unconstitutional. 1 4  However, the Federalists' hopes,
"delusive and visionary, [were] of short duration. The court, a major-
ity of federalists, stern to the principles of our government, and pure
in wisdom and integrity, unanimously declared the law to be constitu-
tional."4 4 The writer celebrated this victory as decisive in the struggle
over the constitution and the courts, and he reveled in the news that
the Federalists' attacks were even alienating New England voters.
Whittington, in the eyes of this writer, was one important step not only
in securing a Republican judiciary, but also in extending their politi-
cal power.
The two parties showed that "spin" is a time-honored American
tradition. Republicans around the country claimed victory immedi-
ately and used the case to support the national repeal in Congress.
The Federalists deployed their editorialists to contest this interpreta-
tion: "The democrats have pretended to exult very much on this deci-
sion, and have endeavored to make the people believe, that it is a
sanction of the repealing law of congress. This opinion can only gain
credit with those who will not read and judge for themselves." This
writer in the Washington Federalist mainly attempted to distinguish
Whittington from the federal case, by focusing on peculiarities of the
Maryland constitution and portraying Whittington's reliance on state
legislation as weaker than the federal judges' reliance on Article III of
the Constitution for their offices." 9 Then the writer noted that the
Maryland court had at least recognized "the power of the court to de-
1t4 NAT'L INTEUIGENCER (Washington),June 14, 1802.
145 BALT. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN, June 24, 1802.
146 Judiciary, BALT. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN, June 24, 1802.
147 Id. (emphasis in original).
148 WASH. FEDERALIST, June 30, 1802.
149 Id.
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clare a law unconstitutional. "l0 This article exaggerated the weakness
of Justice Whittington's case in order to distinguish it from the fed-
eral controversy. The author portrayed the legislative act as "tempo-
rary," but nothing in the law itself made the county courts tempo-
rary-no sunset provision, no term limits, etc-and nothing in the
legislation suggested that it was creating anything less than a life-term
freehold office.
A second writer in the same issue of the Washington Federalist opted
against the strategy of distinguishing the federal judicial battle from
the facts in Whittington.'5' Despite the holding "that the repealing act
is not literally unconstitutional," this Federalist found legal support in
the dicta that the repeal was unconstitutional in spirit. " He noted
that even the Republican judge, Gabriel Duvall, declared the repeal
"inexpedient."'53 He also cited the opinion's conclusion that the re-
peal, "in depriving the judge of his office, is an infraction of his right,
and incompatible with the principles of justice, and does not accord
with sound legislation (which is virtually acknowledging it to be un-
constitutional)." The writer used this dicta to condemn both the
Maryland and the federal repeals, but found it "unaccountable" that
the Maryland General Court would not reach the logical conclusion
that these infractions made the repeal literally unconstitutional."'
"The spirit of the constitution was to bind the legislature as far as pos-
sible from doing injustice and violating [the public's] faith. The cir-
cumstance demonstrates the perpetual tendency of legislative powers
to overstep its legitimate boundaries." 56 With the federal clash loom-
ing, the writer was simultaneously embracing Whittington's dicta and
rejecting its ruling. If the General Court had indeed ruled in favor of
the Federalists, the Federalists obviously would have been even more
united and vocal about the decision.
Several months later, in the midst of the circuit-by-circuit chal-
lenges by the unseated Federalist judges, the Republican press con-
tinued to invoke Whittington as precedent. A Republican paper in
western Massachusetts published an editorial in September on Whit-
tington that was printed widely in other Republican papers. 1 7 The
editorial drew comparisons between Whittington and the federal re-
peal. The Federalists had attacked the Maryland repeal as unconsti-
'r Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
Id.
I55 Id.
Mi Id.
7 PITTSFIELD SUN (Mass.), reprinted in INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 6, 1802.
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tutional "on the same grounds as the late Repeal in Congress." s Af-
ter summarizing the case, the editorial pointed out that the court had
a Federalist majority and even disapproved of the repeal, but still up-
held it because the offices were not explicitly vested by the state con-
stitution. The editorial reported that this decision had deflated the
Federalists' challenge to Congress's repeal, and the Federalists, "after
all their brags and threats, do not seem inclined to hazard another
defeat. '" u°
III. AN ALTERNATIVE WHIrrINGTON
After the ruling came down, it certainly was understandable for
the Federalists to have lost a great deal of hope. Judge Jeremiah
Chase's opinion, despite its lofty dicta about judicial supremacy, her-
alded a retreat from the battle over the judiciary. But the Federalists
could have, and should have, prevailed in Whittington. I suggest three
rulings that would have restored Whittington to office that would
have been more consistent with the concept of "during good behav-
ior" and the rights thatJudge Chase conceded.
A. "Good Behaviour" and Contemporary Arguments
The three alternative rulings I suggest begin with a discussion of
the significance of the wording "during good behaviour," as the key
to judicial independence in America. The term arose in fifteenth-
century England, in response to the problem that kings could dismiss
officeholders from offices held "at pleasure." The wording "during
good behaviour" insulated these offices from such royal caprice, and
it was one of the significant judicial reforms after the Glorious Revo-
lution. "" By these statutes, judges holding their office during "good
behaviour" could be removed only by the procedures explicitly stated
V58 Id.
159 Id.
160 Smith, supra note 22, at 1105-10. Before the fifteenth century, all English officials served
"during pleasure" (quam diu nobis placuerit), and the king could dismiss them at any time. Id.
at 1105. Henry VI then began the practice of appointing officers "during good behaviour," in
order "to protect the patent holders against arbitrary removal from office and loss of emolu-
ments." Id. at 1106. During the Stuart Restoration, the crown returned to "during pleasure"
commissions and removed a high number ofjudges. Id. at 1108-09. Apparently in reaction to
these incursions and abuses, England returned to "good behaviour" appointments after the
Glorious Revolution. The Act of Settlement in 1701 provided that judicial commissions serve
"during good behaviour," containing explicit and limited provisions for removing these judges
as both Houses of Parliament had to pass an address for removal. Id. Initially, these commis-
sions expired when the king or queen expired, but in 1760, an act announced that judges
would continue in office during good behaviour even after the monarch's death, and deaths of
any of his or her successors. Id. at 1110. The construction of "good behaviour" offices with ex-
plicit removal provisions continued in Jamaica. Id. at 1117-18.
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in the statute; otherwise, they could not be removed. In Maryland's
constitution and in its 1796 act, the procedures are limited to two
scenarios: conviction of misbehaviour, or failure to reside in the spe-
cific district.
The colonial period was marked by a struggle for judicial inde-
pendence, and the victory on this issue was signified by the use of
"good behaviour" commissions. In the struggle over judicial inde-
pendence in the 1750s, some colonial leaders declared that the
common law mandated that judicial commissions were held during
good behaviour, and could be removed only for misbehaviour in of-
fice. 1  These pro-independence leaders kept pressing their case, ar-
guing that "good behaviour" was the "ancient and indubitable" com-
mon law, "by the usage and custom of ages; ... by the rules of reason;
... by covenant with the first founder of your government;.., by the
united consent of Kings, Lords, and Commons; ... by birthright and
as Englishmen. '" 161 In the years leading up to the Revolution, the in-
dependence of the judiciary from the Crown was a key issue in a ma-
jority of the colonies, including Maryland, and this debate focused on
offices held during "good behaviour."'"
3"
Once the colonies won their independence, ten of the states
adopted constitutions that guaranteed at least some the judicial
commissions during good behaviour.'4 Some states limited the term
of office, IC but most states, including Maryland, chose life-terms.
I66
This choice is critical to understanding the framing of Maryland's ju-
dicial system as life term (and freehold), as defined against the prac-
tice of a few states to adopt explicit term limits. These ideas were also
included in Federalist No. 78 by Alexander Hamilton. He defended
Article III's guarantee of judicial offices during good behavior as
161 Id. at 1121 (noting that Pennsylvania had such a schema).
162 Id. at 1122 (citing 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, at 256-72 (B.
Bailyn ed., 1965)).
W3 In 1759, pro-judicial independence colonists in the New Jersey assembly battled the crown
over a "good behaviour"judicial commission for Robert Hunter Morris. Id. at 1125-28. Ajudge
ruled that. the commission was valid, and moreover, it was a freehold property-the critical dis-
tinction for the writ of assize of novel disseisin. 1(. at 1128. The pro-British governors contin-
ued to oppose Morris, and the confrontation escalated with the assembly. Id. New York, Penn-
sylvania, the Carolinas, and Massachusetts had similarly bitter confrontations, with assemblies
passing acts establishing good behaviour commissions, and pro-royal governors rejecting them.
Id. at 1122. Benjamin Franklin took up the fight in the 1760s. In his "Causes of the American
Discontents Before 1768," Franklin called for good behaviour judicial commissions, with per-
manent and ample salaries. Id. at 1125. The Crown won the battle after years of struggle, but
the war forjudicial independence and "good behaviour" commissions continued. Id.
NA Id. at 1153-55.
ff Pennsylvania and NewJersey adopted term limited by years, and New York adopted an age
limit. Id.
1 The other states were South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Delaware. Id.
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"certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in
the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier
to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent
barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative
body." 16' This explanation marks the transition of "good behaviour"
from the colonial period to the early republic. The legal language
protected judges not only against governors and their power to dis-
miss officials, but also against legislative abuses. Hamilton argued
generally for the "permanent tenure of judicial offices," so that the
courts could fulfill their role as the "bulwarks of a limited Constitu-
tion against legislative encroachments."'" He noted that the "good
behavior" provision promoted the "impartial administration of the
laws"""' and that temporary appointments would "be fatal to their
necessary independence. Presaging the arguments in favor of
Maryland's judicial reforms of 1796, he also contended that perma-
nent tenure would attract those few individuals with the "integrity"
and "sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of
judges. 17' The Federalist was widely recognized by the central players1.. .. 17'
of the judiciary crisis, from Jefferson to Samuel Chase, 17 and it was
quoted in the newspapers by Federalists against the proposed repeal
of the Judiciary Act. 17t Cousin Jeremiah Chase and other Maryland
leaders were surely familiar with it.
Jefferson also recognized the legal significance of the term "dur-
ing good behaviour." Jefferson's earliest anxiety about the 1801 Judi-
ciary Bill arose from his understanding that judges appointed under
it would have a freehold interest in their offices: "I dread this above
all the measures meditated, because appointments in the nature of
freehold render it difficult to undo what is done."' 75 Jefferson even-
tually concluded that all appointments made after December 12,
1800, when the Jefferson-Burr run-off began, were invalid "nullities,"
167 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kraamnick ed., 1987).
Id. at 440.
Id. at 437.
170 Id. at 441.
1 Id. at 442.
172 Jefferson referred to the Federalist Papers with high praise soon after its publication. Let-
ter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 18, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 188 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1958) (calling The Federalist "the best commentary on
the principles of government which was ever written"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Tho-
mas Mann Randolph, Jr. (May 30, 1790), in 16 id. at 449 ("there is no better book than The Fed-
eralist").
173 In Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798), Chief Justice Samuel Chase praised Publius, the
pseudonym for Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay as authors of The Federalist
Papers, "for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of Government."
174 Balance, WASH. FEDERALIST, Mar. 4, 1802.
175 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 26, 1800), in 6 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 663 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985).
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but he did not arrive at this conclusion immediately. During the
electoral deadlock, Jefferson vacillated between sweeping out all of
Federalist appointees and, more moderately, targeting only the cor-
rupt. 17  By the end of March, Jefferson settled into his position on
removing only the post-December 12 "lame duck" appointees, but he
conceded that their judicial appointments were a formidable "strong
hold, the tenure of which renders it difficult to dislodge them."'77 Jef-
ferson identified five categories of Federalist office holders, some to
be removed and some to be left untouched. "Lame duck" non-
judicial appointees, and officers guilty of "mal-conduct," would have
to go. "Good men," however, would not be removed, and life-term
judges were "irremovable."'78 Jefferson repeatedly mentioned that he
would target the Federalist appointees who held their offices only
"during pleasure,"' 79 but the life appointments were beyond the Re-
publicans' power.'8 ' By 1802, when Congressional Republicans took
the lead in attacking the judiciary, Jefferson followed their position
that the circuit courts could be disassembled.
Of course, these perspectives, from Hamilton to Jefferson, were
based upon constitutional judicial offices. Could the same case be
made for legislatively created offices? One argument can be derived
from legislative intent and a search for consistency in legal terms.
When the legislature used the same language of "good behaviour"
without term limits, it was drawing from the same understanding of
the term from the Maryland Constitution, the colonial experience
and the other state constitutions, and the Federalist Papers. Judges
Chase and Done might have concluded rather easily that the legisla-
ture in 1796 intended to create permanent offices beyond the control
of future legislatures. The General Court judges could have decided
that the term "good behaviour" must have a consistent legal meaning
as establishing a freehold tenure in an office, whether the constitu-
tion or the legislature adopts that wording.
But did legislatures have the power to create such offices? Con-
temporary Federalist leaders were making that very argument. In the
Washington Federalist, "Lucius Junius Brutus," who has been identified
as William Cranch, the chief judge of the D.C. Circuit and the very
influential Supreme Court reporter beginning in 1801, wrote a series
opposing Congress's repeal in early 1802, just as the bill was being
176 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Governor McKean (Feb. 2, 1801), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON 350 (H.A. Washington ed., Taylor and Murray 1854); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Dr. B. S. Barton (Feb. 14, 1801), in id. at 353-54; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Monroe (Mar. 7, 1801), in id. at 367-68.
177 Letter from ThomasJefferson toJoel Barlow (Mar. 14, 1801), in id. at 369-70.
17s Letter from ThomasJefferson to William Branch Giles (Mar. 23, 1800), in id. at 380-81.
17i Letter from ThomasJefferson to Doctor Benjamin Rush (Mar. 24, 1801), in id. at 382-384.
180 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to General Knox (Mar. 27, 1801), in id. at 386.
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debated.' 8' He noted that the commission "durante bene placito [dur-
ing pleasure] has been known in the English law for centuries," long
before the appearance of written constitutions.' "  He cited Lord
Coke's commentaries that explained that any grant "quamdiu se bene
gesserit [during good behavior], &c. or for any like incertain time" is
"an estate for life." 83 Cranch explains that this property interest is
the same as an "estate of freehold in the office."' One of his most
important arguments was that federal judges in America held a sacro-
sanct freehold property interest in their offices for life. While many
of Cranch's arguments involved American precedents based on con-
stitutionally created offices, such as the Case of the Judges in 
Virginia,' 18 5
he also turned to English life tenure offices created by legislation.
Lucius Junius Brutus (Cranch) discussed several English decisions
recognizing that Parliament creates estates for life when it uses the
phrase "during good behaviour" for judicial offices. The first case
was Harcourt v. Fox, decided by the King's Bench in 1693.'m By an act
in 1546, Parliament created a clerk of the peace who was selected by a
county official, and who held his office so long as this official held his
and so long as he behaved well. In 1689, the first year of the reign of
William and Mary after the Glorious Revolution, Parliament passed a
new act that granted the clerk his office "for so long time only as such
Clerk shall well demean himself in his said office.' 87 The plaintiff Har-
court was appointed clerk of the peace in 1689 with a seal using the
wording of the earlier, non-life estate act. Then, in 1691, a new offi-
cial appointed the defendant Fox to replace Harcourt. In 1691, the
King's Bench ruled unanimously in favor of Harcourt, holding that
the act of 1689 established an estate for life in the office. Cranch of-
fered selections from the concurring opinions. Justice Eyres held
that "once the clerk is in his estate in the office, he is SETrLED BY THE
STATUTES, and not by the limitation of the grant," and that the estate
by the statute was "an estate for life...... Justice Dolbert commented that
the dispute "was a plain case, and truly I do not find any difficulty at
181 See WASH. FEDERALIST, Dec. 21, 22, 29, 1801;Jan. 7, 9, 12, 19, 28; Feb. 4, 10, 20; and March
19, 22, 31, 1802. For the identification of Lucius Junius Brutus as Cranch, see WILLIAM
CUSHING, INITIALS AND PSEUDONYMS 42 (1885).
8 LuciusJunius Brutus, No. 10, WASH. FEDERALIST, Feb. 4, 1802.
M Id.
184 LuciusJunius Brutus, No. 12, WASH. FEDERALIST, March 19, 1802.
15 Lucius Junius Brutus, No. 10, WASH. FEDERALIST, Feb. 4, 1802 (discussing the Cases of the
Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 150-51 (1793)). This discussion continued in the
eleventh installment of the series.
186 Lucius Junius Brutus, No. 12, WASH. FEDERALIST, Mar. 19, 1802 (citing Harcourt v. Fox, 1
Shower's Parliamentary Cases 516 (1693)). The following information in the paragraph is from
this Washington Federalist article, unless otherwise noted.
187 Id. (emphasis in original).
188 Id. (emphasis in original).
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all in it," and then asked rhetorically, "for if any one hath an office
granted to him to hold quandiu tantam se bene gesserit, would that
make it not to be an estate for life?"'I The answer for the court was obvi-
ous. Lord Chief Justice Holt similarly believed that the conclusion
was clear: "for my own part I should not have made the least ques-
tion... but that it was an es tate for life."'9" Turning to legislative in-
tent, Chief Justice Holt wrote:
I am more incline to be of this opinion, because I knew the temper and
inclination of Parliament at the time when this act was made; their design
was, that men should have places not to hold precariously or determin-
able upon will and pleasure, but to have a certain,9 durable estate, that
they might act in them without fear of loosing them.' 1
This observation combines the parallel aspects of Maryland's intent
in creating freehold judicial offices. With the same attention to legis-
lative intent, the Maryland General Court would have observed that
the 1796 reform act established life estate offices in order to create
the same stability and to attract better talent, while the 1802 repeal
was a blatant ripper bill designed to strip Federalists of their offices,
and recreate the exact same offices for Republican appointees.
Parliament affirmed Harcourt v. Fox in 1700, and concluded, ac-
cording to Cranch:
That this [office] is an estate for life appears from the words of theAct ....
It is an estate for life, determinable upon misbehaviour, For during good be-
haviour is during life, it is so long as he doth behave himself well in it so
long as he lives, he is to have it as long as he lives- during life and during
good behaviour are therefore synonymous phrases.'and
Parliament did not qualify the estate as existing only for the duration
of the statute, but for the duration of the officeholder's life.
William Cranch then cited Owen v. Sanders, decided by Parliament
in 1699. Parliament declared "that the words quamdiu se bene gesserit
constitute an estate for life," one year before it passed the act of 1700,
which established that judges' commissions would be quamdiu se bene
gesserit.'93 Cranch also described a case in 1706 in which the King's
Bench recognized that such offices are freeholds and can only be lost
by forfeit due to misbehaviour. 4 Cranch reaches a logical conclusion
from the freehold designation:
If an office be granted to a man so long as he shall behave himself well in
it, the grantee hath an estate of freehold in the office; for since nothing
but his misbehaviour can determine his interest, no man can prefix a
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
191 Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
' Id. (emphasis in original).
1I4 Id. (emphasis in original) (case name was not mentioned).
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shorter time than his life; since it must be his own act (which the law does
not presume to foresee) which can only make his estate of shorter con-
tinuance than his life.1
9
5
Cranch concludes his series by addressing the question of whether
Congress can abolish an office, even if the officeholder has a freehold
life interest in the office. Cranch argues that the term "good behav-
iour" is not merely a restriction of power against executive power to
replace at will, but that it is a conveyance of a right to the office-
holder against all encroachments: "the judge gains a title against all the
world."'9 At times in this article, the author argues that the judge
holds his office not by the will of the legislature, but by the power of
the constitution, and by extension, the will of the people. This con-
stitutional argument does not apply in Whittington, but Cranch raises
other strong property arguments that do not depend on the constitu-
tion creating the office. Cranch draws a parallel to other property in-
terests:
[The office is an] estate for life, for years, at will, or in fee simple....
Has not a man as good a tide to an office granted to him for life, as he
has to an acre of land which he holds by the same tenure? ... Having
granted a toll or a rent to a man for life, can the legislature revoke the
grant during the life of the grantee? Can they abolish the toll by repeal-
ing the act which created it, before the life estate is ended?'97
Cranch's arguments in this passage are consistent with fundamental
notions of property law, and rely solely upon the legislature's power
to create property interests. He offers a hypothetical about Congress
leasing Harper's Ferry to an individual for life, and later repealing
the law and suing to eject the individual. Cranch protests that any
court would reject such a repeal, for it would "violate the faith of the
nation," and Congress has "no power to repeal the law during the life
of the lessee."'98 Just as one legislature can create a binding lease and
a secure property claim for an individual which future legislatures
may not destroy, so too may a legislature create a secure office that
future legislature may not destroy. According to Cranch, whether the
life-term office is created by the constitution or by the legislature, the
holder may not be removed, except by death or his own forfeiture by
misbehavior. The historical context of this argument about legisla-
tures granting freehold property interests is particularly significant.
One of the most significant political and social developments of this
era was the settlement of the western frontier. From the Northwest
Ordinance to the Louisiana Purchase, and for the rest of the century,
195 Id.
19 LuciusJunius Brutus, No. 14, WASH. FEDERALIST, Mar. 31, 1802.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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Congress focused on western expansion, not only in terms of real es-
tate, but also in terms of settlement. In the early republic, state legis-
latures focused on the sale of the frontier to private citizens and the
active encouragement of its development. In this context, legisla-
tures were regularly creating freehold property interests. It would
not have been such a logical leap for the Maryland General Court to
extend this power over the development of landed property and
physical infrastructure to the development of government offices and
political infrastructure.
Marbury v. Madison also touches upon the question of property in-
terests in offices. Marbury was appointed Justice of the Peace for
Washington, D.C. by President Adams and Congress in 1801. Similar
to Whittington's office of county justice, Marbury's office was not es-
tablished explicitly by the constitution, but by the legislature. In ad-
dition, Marbury's office was a weaker property interest because it was
a five-year position, not life-tenure. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Mar-
shall concluded, "as the law creating the office, gave the officer a
right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the ap-
pointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights,
which are protected by the laws of his country."' Neither this pas-
sage nor this opinion directly address the question of whether Con-
gress could repeal the law creating the office, but Chief Justice Mar-
shall's use of the terms "not revocable" and "vested property"
throughout the opinion suggest that, at least in terms of property law,
Marbury's rights were secure. However, Marshall found a way to
avoid securing those rights through his maneuvers in constitutional
law. In Stuart v. Laird, the Court recognized Congress's power over
jurisdiction, to create courts and to transfer causes of action, which
provided another constitutional path to acquiescence. However, in
the realm of property law, Marbury suggests that the Midnight Judges
had a property right to their offices, and Laird did nothing to under-
cut that implication.
B. The Alternative Rulings
The Maryland General Court used both property law and consti-
tutional law to avoid confrontation, but it easily could have relied on
both to return Whittington to his office and to secure the rights of all
freehold office holders. Judge Chase was correct that the Maryland
constitution designated that judges "shall hold their commissions
during good behavior" and that "all civil officers.., who do not hold
[their] commissions during good behaviour, shall be appointed an-
IN Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 162 (1803).
2W 5 U.S. 299 (1803).
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nually."201 Nevertheless, there is a large gap between these two cate-
gories; Chase exaggerates the dichotomy between the two offices.
According to English precedent, the legislature could create civil of-
fices that held their commissions during good behaviour, and the
Maryland constitution did not deny this power to the legislature.
Thus, Whittington's office would not have fallen into the category of
"civil officers who do not hold their commission during good behav-
iour," and his office accordingly would be protected. This interpreta-
tion and analysis applies to all three alternative rulings.
The most hard-line opinion would have been completely consis-
tent with Cranch's arguments and his citations to English precedent.
Just as Parliament had the power to create freehold "good behaviour"
offices that could not be taken away (except by the procedures laid
out in the statute), so too could the Maryland legislature create free-
hold offices when it used the term "good behaviour." No future legis-
lature could remove him from office as long as he maintained good
behavior and resided in his district. The assize of novel disseisin was
the appropriate writ for such a freehold office.
The General Court might have conceded that the legislature
could alter jurisdiction and transfer causes of action, which would
have given the Maryland legislature an alternate path in diverting
power away from the Federalist county justices. However, it would
have at least preserved the judicial offices and some judicial power-
both of the county justices like Whittington and of the General Court
itself-and it would have checked the power of the legislature.
A second alternative is slightly more moderate. Judges Chase and
Done might have found a middle ground between Cranch's argu-
ments and the decision in Whittington. Beginning with the same cases
cited by Cranch (Harcourt v. Fox and Owen v. Sanders), the General
Court could have introduced the principle that legislatures do have
the power to create long-term offices that bind future governments.
The General Court might have distinguished the English constitu-
tional system, in which Parliament is the final and supreme authority,
from the new American system in which the Constitution has that
privileged role. In Harcourt and Owen, Parliament created offices in
the same way the Constitution creates offices. In Maryland, and
throughout the United States, the power that had been Parliament's
became divided between the Constitution as the higher law and ulti-
mate authority, and the legislature as the statutory and spending
authority bound by the Constitution. The state constitution inherits
the supreme power to create permanent offices, but that division
does not end the legislature's power to create protected offices.
201 Whittington, 1 H. &J. at 247.
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In order to give meaning to the 1796 act's use of the term "during
good behaviour," the General Court could construct a meaning par-
allel to the constitutional use of the phrase, but without quite as
much protection against repeal. Citing Harcourt, the Maryland court
could have inquired about the intent of the past legislature that cre-
ated these offices, and the intent of the present legislature that abol-
ished these offices. The court would have found that the 1796 Mary-
land legislature established these offices for "good behaviour" in
order to make them more permanent and to attract better judges, to
keep them in office, to promote judicial independence, and to create
a more efficient system of appointment. Balancing the property
rights of the judges against the power of the present legislature, the
General Court might have inquired into the intent and purposes of
the present legislature in revising the judiciary's structure, and it
would have found that the Republicans' intent violated the original
purposes of the statute. In order to abolish non-constitutional offices
held "during good behaviour," the Maryland court might have re-
quired that the legislature demonstrate some non-partisan interest in
altering these courts, and to alter these courts only in accordance
with these goals, while retaining the same offices and office-holders
when possible. The bottom line is that the court could have chosen
some limited ruling that would hold, at minimum, that such ripper
bills were invalid if applied to offices held during good behavior.
Such a decision would have given some meaning to the 1796 act's
wording. Most importantly, it would have established judicial review
in reality and robustly, notjust in empty dicta.
A third option, still more moderate than the others, would have
vindicated Whittington's claim with a simple rule: If the legislature
repeals an office or system of offices, and then recreates the same of-
fice (or a substantially similar office), then that new office is not va-
cant, but rather, it is automatically possessed by the previous office
holder. As long as the office exists in any statutory manifestation,
then the original officeholder still possesses a freehold claim on that
office. The legislature may strip that freeholder from the office only
by completely abolishing that office and not creating a similar entity
thereafter.
If the legislature repeals an office and then recreates that same of-
fice as vacant, such an action is evidence (at least prima facie) of po-
litical motivation to replace the office holder. In order to preserve
the historical and legislative meaning of "good behaviour" as a degree
of protection against political control of such offices, the court
should preserve the office holder's freehold property right. When
the Whittington court refused to ask about motives about the repeal,
they were specifically avoiding these issues in order to simplify the
case and avoid a dangerous and controversial ruling.
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Once the question of rights is resolved, next comes the question
of remedy. The General Court held that the assize of novel disseisin
applies only to freehold offices, not to offices held for terms of years.
The Court implied that the term of years, though not stated in the
law creating the office, is the duration of the law itself. The Court
also implied, in its distinction between constitutional 'judges" and
legislatively created 'justices," that the judges do have a freehold in-
terest in their offices. Both Cranch and Jefferson used the term free-
hold to describe these offices.02 In his Commentaries, written almost
four decades before the Maryland Court decided Whittington, William
Blackstone defines freehold as "an estate for life," and not inheritable
to descendants.2 3  A grant of property can be a freehold even if it
does not state expressly that it is an "estate for life," but also "by a
general grant, without defining or limiting any specific date." 2°4 This
definition fits the office of county justice as created by the Maryland
legislature in 1796. The renowned work by Pollock and Maitland de-
fines freehold by negation: a freeholder "does not hold merely at the
will of another, and that he does not hold for some definite space of
time: a tenant at will is not a freeholder, a tenant for years is not a
freeholder. 205 The General Court could easily have ruled that the
countyjustice was not a tenant by anyone else's will, and his office was
not limited by years. Hence, it was a freehold. Pollock and Maitland
also extend these property rules to offices. Legislation in 1285 speci-
fied that the assize of novel disseisin applied to "offices in fee. ' Pol-
lock and Maitland continued, "the assize [of novel disseisin] which
protects the possessor of land seems the natural defence for the pos-
session of an office .... 07
Underscoring the significance of this assize, Maryland's Bill of
Rights demonstrates that the assize of novel disseisin was probably in
current use. The Bill of Rights barred the "disseising of property"
and the loss of property unless by due process and the law. If the
court had adopted the first decision I suggested above, that the legis-
lature has the power to create freehold offices, this conclusion that
the assize applies is simple. If the court adopted the second decision,
that the legislature may revoke these offices, but only after articulat-
ing general non-partisan purposes and narrowly tailoring its revisions,
or the third alternative decisions, that the legislature could not recre-
ate the same office and consider it vacant, the conclusion is more dif-
o See supra text accompanying notes 181 and 190.
203 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 120-21.
204 Id. at 121.
205 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARDI 357 (2d ed. 1968).
2 id. at 135.
207 Id.
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ficult. However, the court could analogize these offices to the consti-
tutionally created offices. Constitutional offices are life-tenure, but
they are also contingent upon the continuance of the constitution
and upon the amendment process. Whittington's office is similarly
contingent on legislative action, but such contingencies are not "a
term of years," and are indefinite in a parallel way. Thus, the court
could hold that both offices are freehold estates with certain restric-
tions and contingencies.
These arguments have a solid basis in property law and in consti-
tutional law. In the abstract, Cranch's arguments are legally more
persuasive than the highly formalistic and evasive ones offered by the
Whittington Court. Considering the consensus about offices held
"during good behaviour" among Federalists and many Republicans,
and considering that Judge Chase and Judge Done shared the same
partisan interests as Cranch, it is stunning that the General Court
chose such a feeble escape. The fact that two Federalist judges ig-
nored the strong arguments from their Federalist colleagues spoke
volumes about the weakness of these judges and the institutional
power of the judiciary in general. Other Federalists were calling for a
direct confrontation in the courts over the independence of the judi-
ciary to test these issues and win on the merits.' It was also a chance
to bring the legal issues to the public, demonstrating the Republi-
cans' radicalism and disregard for law and order, and winning back
political ground.
There are problems with the moderate second and third strategies
that I suggested. First, they would have allowed the Republican legis-
lature to repeal the state's 1796 Judiciary Act again in the next session
(beginning in November 1802), but then completely revising the ju-
dicial system, rather than recreating the same system. This legislation
would be more difficult to challenge, and the confrontation would
escalate. Second, the court's effort to appease both the Federalists
and the Republicans might have angered both sides, and it was politi-
cally safer simply to please the ascendant Republicans. But this is
precisely the point: The General Court was more concerned with its
2M Roger Griswold embraced the idea of escalating judicial conflict, as a direct confronta-
tion between the branches:
The only hope of correcting their usurpation remains with the Judges themselves, who
may perhaps, still pronounce the Act to be void-If a case should be brought up, & the
Courts should pronounce such a decision, the consequence must be that the Legislature
must recede from its claims, or a collision of the most serious nature must take place be-
tween the departments-My own opinion is; that the Legislature will give way, because
there is not nerve enough to persevere, & because many of those who have voted for the
present bill, still admit that the Courts may pronounce on the Constitutionality of Laws.
Letter from Roger Griswold to Oliver Wolcott (Mar. 5, 1801), in OLIVER WOLCOTT PAPERS (on
file with the Connecticut Historical Society).
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own political safety than with supporting the Federalists or with up-
holding the law.
By ruling in favor of Whittington and by protecting "good behav-
iour" offices against the legislature, Judge Jeremiah Chase and Done
would have pleased their Federalist allies, and by ruling that the legis-
lature has the power to repeal "good behaviour" offices, the court
could have mollified the Republicans. The court also would have
recognized the freehold property right of constitutional judges
against the power of legislatures, which would have been a major
boost to the Federalists mobilizing against Congress's repeal. Even if
one disagrees with the foregoing suggestions of alternatives, I con-
tend that if the Federalist judges on the General Court had the cour-
age and the will to defend the rights of fellow Federalist judges, they
had several strong legal arguments at their disposal. These judges of
the General Court were effectively creating constitutional law in 1802,
and that fluidity offered an opportunity to go in many different direc-
tions. The General Courtjudges chose a path of acquiescence.
IV. IMPACT
A. The Context and Course of Events
This Part examines how Whittington v. Polk affected the events that
followed, and speculates about how those events might have been dif-
ferent had the Federalists won. Most of this Part is speculative and
lacks direct evidence. But by piecing together what we know of the
actors and the significance of Whittington, this Part offers an interpre-
tation that helps answer some major questions about Marbury and the
battle over the judiciary.
First, several historians have wondered why the public and the
media failed to appreciate the Supreme Court's use ofjudicial review
and its statements of judicial supremacy in Marbury.2°9 Donald Dewey
suggests that the media failed to understand the complexities of the
decision.1 This answer might apply to most newspapers, but it does
not explain why the legally savvy newspapers in Washington did not
weigh in, especially considering that they had vocal partisan legal ex-
perts such as William Cranch. Robert Lowry Clinton argues that the
doctrine of judicial review had already been established in other
3 ALBERT BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 153; CLINTON, supra note 3, at 102-03;
DONALD DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF MARBURY V
MADISON 135-36 (1970); HAINES, supra note 3, at 232; HASKINS &JOHNSON, supra note 112, at
215-17; MCCLOSKEY, supra note 5, at 43-44; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 231-32 (1922).
210 DEWEY, supra note 209, at 135.
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courts (such as the Maryland General Court in Whittington), so Mar-
bury was no big news."' However, if the media understood that the
Supreme Court was now adopting this doctrine as a direct and power-
ful challenge to the Republicans, then this would have been very big
news. Perhaps the media understood that the Court left the Federal-
ists without any options, and thus this decision was not such a direct
confrontation.
Haskins and Johnson have the best answer: the Court's opinion in
Stuart v. Laird, issued six days after Marbuy, indicated more forcefully
that the Supreme Court had capitulated to the Republicans on the
judiciary.1 2 But why was there so little response to Marbury in the
week before Laird came down? Perhaps the newspapers and politi-
cians understood that Laird was the main event, and they were not
going to trumpet Marbury until they knew the result in Laird. Never-
theless, the Federalists and Republicans had already demonstrated
that they were masters of spin on the judiciary question. Why did the
Federalists choose not to spin Marbuy as a victory, before and after
Laird? I suggest that the Federalists were getting all too familiar with
defeats on this issue, most notably in Whittington. After the Federalist-
controlled lower courts refused to stand up to the Republicans, they
hoped that the Supreme Court, the home of the least vulnerable
judges and the most reliable pro-Federalists, might finally take a
stand. Once the Supreme Court announced that it was passing the
buck back to those same lower courts, the Federalists knew that the
legal fight was over. This interpretation explains why the Federalist
and Republican media ignored Marbury's pronouncements about ju-
dicial power-because they were empty threats that could not be en-
forced in other venues.
This interpretation also helps explain why the Federalist plaintiffs
also failed to pursue their claims in the lower courts. If the Supreme
Court had recognized that the Justices of the Peace, and by exten-
sion, the Midnight Judges, had a vested property right, why did they
not pursue some kind of remedy, even if it was limited solely to their
salary or other damages? Surely there were Federalist district court
judges and Federalist state judges who might have been more sympa-
thetic to these claims. Nevertheless, Whittington might have made
Marbury, a Marylander, and Philip Barton Key, a Midnight Judge
from Maryland, give up on Maryland state courts, and it might have
sent a broader signal to all of these litigants that they should quit
while they were ahead, even if being "ahead" was simply the empty
threat ofjudicial review in Marbuy.
211 CUNTON, supra note 3, at 102-03.
212 HASKINS &JOHNSON, supra note 112, at 215-17.
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The events following the Maryland General Court ruling indicate
that Jefferson was perfectly happy with the dicta of judicial review, as
long as the holdings were pro-Republican. Jefferson offered Gabriel
Duvall, who concurred in Whittington, the office of Comptroller of the
211Treasury in November 1802. Jefferson fawned over Duvall in a let-
ter asking him to accept the appointment.214  Presumably, Jefferson
was pleased with Duvall's opinion in Whittington just five months be-
fore. This appointment occurred just weeks before oral argument in
Marbury, so it is possible that Duvall's appointment soon after Whit-
tington was Jefferson's subtle signal to the Supreme Court that Jeffer-
son could accept the dicta of judicial review, as long as the holding
came out in his favor.
The Justices then followed through with their decision to ride cir-
cuit in autumn 1802, and ignored the Federalists' challenges to their
jurisdiction. While riding the Fourth Circuit in December, Marshall,
together with District Judge Cyrus Griffin, ruled against such a chal-
lenge in Laird, but without a published opinion.t 5 Perhaps Marshall
began picking up on the theme of balancing weak holdings with bold
dicta about judicial review, because days after Laird, he asserted judi-
216cial power in Ogden v. Witherspoon on the same circuit run. Ogden,
along with Whittington, is considered an immediate precursor to Mar-
bury and judicial review,21' and it is intriguing that Chief Justice Mar-
shall wrote the circuit opinion, and that the ruling occurred at the
same time as Marshall's ruling in Laird v. Stuart. While Marshall was
willing to give up the fight over the Midnight Judges in the politically
controversial case, he was able to establish both a ruling and strong
dicta for judicial supremacy in Ogden, a politically neutral case. In
Ogden, the North Carolina legislature enacted a bill in 1789 on credi-
tor-debtor statute of limitations, which conflicted with an Act of
1715.218 Then, in 1799, the state legislature enacted a bill continuing
the Act of 1715. Marshall ruled that the Act of 1789 repealed the Act
213 Duvall became comptroller of the U.S. Treasury on December 15, 1802. Dillard, supra
note 43, at 423.
214 Letter from ThomasJefferson to Gabriel Duvall (Nov. 5, 1802), in DUVALL PAPERS (on file
with the Library of Congress):
I shall be very happy if it shall appear acceptable to you, and shall think I have well per-
formed my duty if I can get the office placed in hands who enjoys and who has so much
merited the public confidence. As soon as you can satisfactorily to yourself decide on
this proposition, I will thank you for an answer. I only observe that the sooner it is ob-
tained the more convenient it will be to the department, which suffers while wanting so
important an officer in it's [sic] organisation. I pray you to accept assurances of my sin-
cere esteem & high consideration.
215 ELSMERE, supra note 37, at 147.
216 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 227 (1802) (this case is also known as Ogden v. Blackledge, due to confu-
sion about captions).
217 See HAINES, supra note 3.
218 Ogden, 3 N.C. at 227.
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of 1715, so the legislature's Act of 1799 was void. This holding estab-
lished an important precedent for judicial review, and Marshall
added a strong statement in favor ofjudicial supremacy:
And the question here is, does it belong to the judiciary to decide upon
laws when made, and the extent and operation of them; or to the legisla-
ture? If it belongs to the judiciary, then the matter decided by this
act.., is ajudicial matter, and not a legislative one." 9
Marshall answered this question by voiding the state law as impairing
the obligation of contracts in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the
U.S. Constitution.
In Ogden, Marshall accomplished several significant goals. He es-
tablished judicial supremacy over state legislatures in interpreting law
(and conflict of laws), based upon constitutional separation of pow-
ers. Marshall also elevated the force of the Federal Constitution's
contract clause. Finally, he was able to balance out the judicial weak-
ness in Laird v. Stuart at the same time as a case strongly establishing
judicial supremacy-and thereby strengthening Federalist power. In
February, the Supreme Court then adopted the same balance in Mar-
bury, and then upheld Laird, while carefully not surrendering too
much in Justice Paterson's careful, narrow opinion. Paterson merely
granted Congress the power to alter jurisdiction, and held that the
Supreme Court Justices did not require specific commissions in order
to ride circuit, because the Justices had acquiesced to this system for
thirteen years. The language of the opinion again masked the retreat
from confrontation in the decision-again similar to Whittington.
Even though Marbuy clearly established the rights of the Justices
of the Peace, and implied that they (and the Midnight Judges) could
turn to lower courts with the proper original jurisdiction, none of
them did so. One reason, among others, is that these Federalists ex-
pected little to come from these efforts, as the Maryland General
Court first demonstrated in Whittington. Marylander Philip Barton
Key, one of the MidnightJudges who remained active in the cause for
a while, and several Justices of the Peace (including Marylander Mar-
bury) conceivably might have tried to seek damages in state court,
but Whittington suggested that such efforts would be futile and poten-
tially counterproductive. These potential plaintiffs probably under-
stood that Whittington represented a general reluctance of lower court
judges to intervene and risk their own job security. This signal also
suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court was well aware that there
probably would be no relief in these lower courts, so that they were
truly passing the buck into oblivion in Marbury, rather than establish-
ing the next stage of the battle.
219 Id. at 228-29.
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Rather than being mollified by acquiescence, the Maryland legis-
lature proposed an even more radical revision of the state judiciary.
In the fall of 1802, the legislature passed a bill eliminating the Gen-
eral Court entirely, vesting all original jurisdiction in the county
courts and all appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals.m The
bill had to be passed in two consecutive sessions in order to become
law, so the stakes were raised for the fall of 1803.2' During this ongo-
ing campaign, Justice Samuel Chase, while speaking to a grand jury as
he rode circuit, flew into a tirade against these attacks on the judici-
ary, which was the ostensible grounds for his impeachment. ' Chase
complained bitterly to the grand jury about the Republican repeal of
the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the proposed changes in the Maryland
judicial system. Chase warned that these revisions would:
[T] ake away all security for property, and personal Liberty. The inde-
pendence of the National Judiciary is already shaken to its foundation;
and the virtue of the people alone can restore it. The independence of
the Judges of this State will be entirely destroyed, if the Bill for the abol-
ishing the two Supreme Courts, should be ratified by the next General
Assembly.
2 23
The reform of 1801 had been merely the opening assault by the Re-
publicans, and Chase decided that he would put his career on the
line to prevent further losses. The Republican House cited this tirade
prominently in their impeachment ofJustice Chase in 1804.24
Despite the efforts of the General Court Judges to pacify the Re-
publicans, Whittington did not avert the confrontation. In fact, it first
emboldened the Republicans to press on. Ultimately, moderate Re-
publicans in Maryland broke away from the reform efforts and united
with Federalists to defeat the final passage of the bill in the fall of
1803 . '5 Maryland's moderate Republicans and moderate Federalists
formed an "open alliance" that guided state politics in the following
226years. Maryland again mirrored the national trend, as moderate
Republican Congressman ceased their attacks on the judiciary and
refused to convict Samuel Chase in his impeachment trial.27
2M ELIS, supra note 3, at 244.
221 Id.
Id.
HAW, supra note 34, at 215.
224 Id.
5 ELMIS, supra note 3, at 244.
6 Id. at 245.
Id. at 102-07.
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B. A Parallel Universe ofJudicial Intervention
What if the Maryland General Court overturned the ripper bill
and returned William Whittington to office? The Federalists would
have been energized, gaining legal and political momentum, as well
as an influential precedent. The Supreme Court Justices would have
been forced to reconsider a boycott of riding circuit. After a pro-
Federalist decision, it would have been much more difficult for the
Justices to ignore the decision and its legal arguments, and to ignore
the building political pressure to boycott the circuits. In the wake of
the General Court's decision against the Federalists, the Justices' de-
cision to ride circuit was less surprising, and the Federalists could still
hope for vindication once the Supreme Court regrouped to hear the
arguments in 1803. But if the Maryland General Court had held in
favor of Whittington and the Federalists, the decision to ride circuit
would have been seen more clearly as a capitulation and as a sudden
setback. In June 1802, the Justices were still debating whether or not
to ride circuit, and the decision had not yet been finalized. 2 Recall
that Justice Chase had been focusing on Whittington v. Polk in his let-
ters to the other Justices in April 1802, and in those same letters, he
strongly urged the Justices not to ride circuit by using the same kinds
of property arguments at stake in Whittington.'2
If Vhittington had come out the other way, the Justices faced a de-
cision about riding circuit with more immediate significance. A pro-
Federalist decision in Maryland would have raised the Federalists' ex-
pectations that the Supreme Court would carry on the fight. If the
Justices decided to ride circuit at that point, they would have revealed
more clearly that they were retreating from the Republicans, and
many would have interpreted such a decision as a repudiation of the
Maryland General Court and its assertion of judicial review. Riding
circuit at that point might have triggered a more angry Federalist re-
sponse against the Court. This pressure might have encouraged the
Justices to reconsider their decision to ride circuit, which would have
dramatically altered the course of events leading to Marbury. In Mar-
bury, the Justices were able to frame their decision as delegating re-
sponsibility to the lower courts. If the Maryland court had blocked
the legislature's repeal of 1801, the Justices similarly could decide not
to ride circuit and claim to be passing the responsibility to lower
courts. The Justices could be passive-aggressive, citing Whittington
M See Letter from William Cushing to Samuel Chase (June 11, 1802), in CUSHING PAPERS (on
file with the Massachusetts Historical Society).
Letter from Justice Samuel Chase to ChiefJustice Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in HASKINS &
JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 172-77 n. 182.
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and announcing that they could not ride circuit until these legal is-
sues were fully sorted out.
Perhaps the more reluctant justices (Cushing, Paterson and Wash-
ington) would have continued to argue against riding circuit. How-
ever, Samuel Chase might have insisted that he could not ride circuit
in Maryland if his cousin Jeremiah Chase had made a clear statement
against such repeals in Whittington. Samuel Chase may have been
particularly emboldened by his cousin and close friend, and he would
have been very reluctant to embarrass Jeremiah by riding circuit.
Samuel Chase, a hothead, might have announced to the other Jus-
tices that, if they were not going to join him, he would boycott his cir-
cuit on his own. Then, perhaps, Marshall may have intervened to en-
courage the Court not to fracture, and to support Chase's boycott.
This emphasis on a unified court was a core principle of Marshall's
entire tenure as Chief Justice. Marshall may have pushed harder for
a boycott than he did in April 1802, and the combination of Chase's
brinksmanship and more strident arguments from Marshall might
have won over a few of the other Justices. But a lone boycott by
Chase would have been enough to escalate the confrontation and
provoke a Republican reprisal.
And even if all the Justices still decided to ride circuit, perhaps the
Maryland General Court would have become the source for an in-
junction against Samuel Chase on behalf of Philip Barton Key's
property interest in his office. In this alternative universe of a con-
frontational decision in Whittington, Judge Jeremiah Chase and Judge
Done would be hard-liners, rather than cautious. The judges in this
scenario would have felt more pressure to defend their decision and
their turf, and Justice Chase would have been more than happy to ac-
cept this legal order. On the other hand, if the General Court had
intervened on behalf of Whittington, the judicial battle in Maryland
would have escalated even more. There may have been a new repeal
challenge in November 1802, and the legislature's more confronta-
tional 1802-03 changes would have been more likely to pass.
If just one Justice decided to boycott the circuits, the calls for im-
peachment would have been even more immediate. Then the Jus-
tices would have been forced to back down even more obviously,
crippling their independence, or they would have stared down Jeffer-
son and perhaps jeopardized their offices and the entire judiciary.
Perhaps the moderate Republicans would have continued to support
the radicals, finding Chase and other Justices guilty of misbehavior.
The decision not to ride circuit would have prevented Marshall
from hearing Laird and Ogden. Instead, the Republicans would have
had to create their own Stuart v. Laird in one of the circuits, to con-
test the jurisdiction of the Midnight Judges. With the issues framed
differently, and with an opposite decision in Whittington as precedent,
perhaps this new Laird decision comes out differently. In December
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1802, Federalists speculated that there would be two dissents in
Laird-presumably Marshall and Chase.2 ° Given a few changes of
events, it is possible that they might at least have followed through
with dissents, especially if they were emboldened by the Maryland
court.
Even if the Justices did not boycott the circuits, an interventionist
Maryland court would have shaped the drafting of Marbury itself.
When the Supreme Court wrote Marbury, it could appear to pass the
buck to the lower courts with original jurisdiction, knowing from
Whittington that lower courts were even less enthusiastic about inter-
vening against the Republicans. Whittington allowed the Supreme
Court to write with confrontational grandeur about judicial suprem-
acy without actually being confrontational; Marshall could bark,
knowing that there was no bite. But if the Maryland General Court
had interposed against the Republicans in Whittington, Marshall
would have had to think twice about barking so loudly, for the Jeffer-
sonians would have understood that there might be some bite, and
they might have been far less tolerant of such an opinion. Thus, the
majority of the Justices, who worried about appearing too obstruc-
tionist, might have written a much more meek opinion for Marbuly
without any of the hallmarks of judicial review and without any
threats to the Republicans. That opinion might have been the major-
ity opinion, leaving Marshall and Chase to wrestle with signing onto
that opinion or writing a concurrence about the power of judicial re-
view. Given such a turn of events, such a weak Marbury, perhaps with
a fractured Court, would look much different to contemporaries and
to future readers.
CONCLUSION
There is no way of knowing how a different Whittington might have
changed the course of events and altered the shape of the early Mar-
shall Court and Jefferson's presidency. It is certainly possible that
most of the final results in Marbury would not have changed so sig-
nificantly. Even if nothing changed in practice, a strong Maryland
decision would have at least raised expectations for the Supreme
Court, and the public would have been even more aware that the Jus-
tices were dodging the fight. But it is certainly likely that a Maryland
decision in favor of the Federalists would have mobilized the Federal-
N Letter from Sen. William Plumer to Livermore (Dec. 12, 1802), in PLUMER PAPERS (on file
with the Library of Congress):
It is said Chief Justice Marshall has over-ruled a plea to the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court in Virginia, without deciding whether the repeal of the Judiciary law was constitu-
tional. A writ of I- [original illegible] is bro't [brought] & it is said the Supreme Court
will, with two dissenting votes, confirm the decision.
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ist hard-liners to raise the stakes, and the Justices would have faced a
more difficult decision about riding circuit and about challenging the
Republican Congress. With Justice Chase following Whittington
closely and using it as a precedent for boycotting the circuits, the de-
bate would have shifted afterJune 1802. Considering Justice Chase's
connection to Judge Jeremiah Chase, and considering how explosive
and confrontational he was, there is no telling how he may have be-
gun a domino effect leading to a very different series of events. If the
Maryland General Court had blocked the Republicans, perhaps there
would have been no survival of the Marshall Court. Some of the Jus-
tices may have changed their strategies, and the Court might have
fractured. The judiciary fight might have escalated, and the Jefferso-
nians might have fought back with impeachments and convictions.
At the very least, it is important to get the interpretation of the
decision right, and to recognize the contingency and the unpredict-
ability of the struggle over the judiciary. The bottom line is that the
Maryland General Court chose capitulation and not power, which
other scholars have failed to recognize. These Federalist judges ig-
nored the more persuasive arguments of other Federalists and de-
cided the case wrongly. This was not simply a mistake, but a choice
out of fear more than reason. Because Whittington truly stands for the
weakness of the Federalist judges, it also illuminates Marbury as a lot
less than meets the eye.
Marbury did not appear ex nihilo. It was shaped by particular cir-
cumstances and precedents. But once Marbuiy is identified more
clearly as an act of judicial weakness, we should not dismiss the role
of the Marshall Court in establishing judicial supremacy; rather, we
should shift our emphasis on how and when it established judicial su-
premacy. Chief Justice Marshall's clever retreat in 1803 was a wise
survival strategy, and it allowed him to live to fight another day.
Other historians have identified the Marshall Court's golden age as
1812 to 1825, and during this period Marshall built the Supreme
Court's power-but at the price of state power, not congressional
power. From this foundation of prestige, future Justices could launch
judicial review of Congress without the smoke and mirrors employed
in Marbury. Lawyers, historians and judges should recognize how ju-
dicial review developed in stages through American history-from
Dred Scott to The Civil Rights Cases, to the Lochner Court, to the clash
over the New Deal, to Brown and the Warren Court to Roe v. Wade,
and now to the Rehnquist Court. We now live in a time of unprece-
dented judicial activism against Congress, most notably in federalism
cases. Perhaps the most relevant language in Whittington was not its
dicta about judicial supremacy, but its dicta about judicial caution.
Judge Jeremiah Chase warned that the judiciary should not intervene
every time a legislative act violated the Constitution, because such ag-
gressive judicial review "subverts the government and reduces the
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people to a state of nature, and therefore cannot be the proper mode
of redress to remedy the evils resulting from an act passed in violation
of the constitution.,1' He suggested that the courts should weigh the
interests on each side and then decide if its power is properly used
case by case. The Marshall Court followed this thinking in practice by
not recognizing a remedy for Marbury's right. Today's Justices, on
the left and the right, demonstrate too little attention to balancing
232their use ofjudicial review according to the rights involved.
Marbury was a time capsule: the Marshall Court buried the threat
ofjudicial review of Congress within a decision of capitulation, so that
this power could hide underground for several decades. A later gen-
eration unearthed Marbury, detached from its historical context of
-weakness. In a time when the Court had gained enough stature, in
part because of Marshall's later accomplishments, this new genera-
tion wielded Marbury in a starkly different way. Marbury was an im-
portant antecedent, but citing Marbury is not enough to explain the
Supreme Court's power of judicial review. Certainly, a new account
of some obscure case from 1802 should not tear down the temple of
judicial review. However, it should cause us to reconsider how this
temple was built, how this temple might never have been built at all,
and how this temple should be respected and not exploited today.
2W1 Whittington v. Polk, I H. &J. 236, 243 (Md. 1802).
232 Most questionable are the decisions striking down federal antidiscrimination laws, labor
laws and gun control laws because of federalism concerns. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ.
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars individuals'
suits against states under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars individuals' suits against states un-
der the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (striking down § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress's
Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment powers); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by individuals against states in any federal
judicial forum); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as exceeding Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down parts of Gun Free School Zones Act for ex-
ceeding the Commerce Clause). From the other side of aisle, the Court's recent pornography
decisions also raise questions about the proper use of judicial review, because obscenity is not
protected speech. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002) (holding that sec-
tions of the Child Pornography Act were unconstitutional in prohibiting computer graphics
that depicted child pornography); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group Inc., 529 U.S. 803
(2000) (finding that the First Amendment did not allow § 505 of the Telecommunications Act,
which limited access to adult channels); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that "in-
decent" and "patently offensive" material on the internet is protected under the First Amend-
ment).
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